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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRISON DISCIPLINE
HARVARD CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE*

In recent years there has been growing attention
to the question of prisoners' rights and to problems
relating to discretion in prison administration.
The catastrophe at Attica greatly increased the
concern over conditions and inadequacies in our
nation's correctional institutions.'
One crucial aspect of correctional problemsinmate discipline-was faced in a consent decree
issued on March 11, 1970, by Federal Judge
Raymond J. Pettine.2 In Morris v. Travisono,3
Judge Pettine established comprehensive procedural regulations for the handling of disciplinary
matters in the Rhode Island Adult Correctional
Institution (ACI). A short time after the entry of
that decree, the Center for Criminal Justice at
Harvard Law School agreed to study the impact
of the Morris decision within the prison. 4 This
* This article is the result of research undertaken in
the summer of 1970 by the Center for Criminal Justice
of the Harvard Law School. Edward J. Dauber, Harvard Law School '69, had continuing responsibility for
the project and the preparation of this article. Mr.
Dauber, a staff member of the Center until July, 1971,
is now a member of the faculty of the Institute of
Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Tel
Aviv, Israel. William Falik, Harvard Law School '72,
did field work and wrote and edited much of the article.
The planning for the project and the analysis of the

data were directed by James Vorenberg, Professor of
raw at Harvard Law School and Director of the Center
for Criminal Justice, and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Professor of
Criminology at Harvard Law School and Research
Director of the Center. Elinor Halprin, a staff member
of the Center, assisted with the writing and did much
of the editing.
In addition, Kenneth McNerny, Harvard Law
School '72, Charles Hollen, Harvard Law School '71,

and Alma Young, then a staff member of the Center,
did field work and contributed material for the article.
Comments and suggestions were received from Paul
Nejelski, then Assistant Director of the Center, and
Bertram Griggs and Gary McCune, both Fellows of the
Center for Criminal Justice in 1970-71. Mr. Griggs is
now Superintendent of the California Institution for
Men at Chino, California, and Mr. McCune is Associate
Warden at the Federal Correctional Institution at

Lompoc, California.
'N. Y. Times. Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
2310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
3Id.

The Center began its study in June, 1970, with the

article documents and analyzes the results of that
study.
There were several reasons for the study. The
recent furor over the treatment of inmates, 5
much of it centering on the problems of inmate
discipline, indicated a definite need for an objective investigation of prison disciplinary practices. Moreover, while alleged abuses of discretion
by correctional administrators have become increasingly a concern of the courts, in formulating
their decisions they have available little empirical
information and analysis treating the central
problem of balancing prison administrative needs
with inmate rights.
primary field work conducted from June to August,
1970. A variety of research techniques were employed:
(1) A sample of 460 disciplinary records from both the
maximum and medium-minimum facilities were examined, 263 from maximum covering the period from July,
1969, to October, 1970, and 194 from medium-minimum
covering the January, 1968-December, 1969 period.
These records were chosen because they were readily
available at the prison, and because they covered
periods both before and after the entry of the Morris
decree. (2) Disciplinary and classification hearings were
observed during the summer of 1970. Of the 163 hearings monitored, 58 were disciplinary proceedings. (3) A
sample of sixty inmates was interviewed. (4) Staff members were interviewed. (5) Related court proceedings
were monitored.
5 During the past few years, there have been large
numbers of inmate protests, strikes, and rebellions, of
which Attica was certainly the most disastrous. Litigation dealing with matters of internal prison administration has proliferated and model bills of rights for
inmates have cropped up throughout the country. In
addition, legal journals and other media have given
prison problems increasing attention. See, e.g., Hirschkop & Milleman, The Unconstitutionality of Prison
Life, 55 VA. L. Rav. 795 (1969); Kimball & Newman,
Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat

and Response, 14 Canmr

& D IaN. 1 (1968); Kraft,

Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due

Process Provided?, 47 N.D.L. Rxv. 9 (1970); Rubin,
Developments in CorrectionalLaw, 16 Ciz= & DELIn.
185 (1970); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in
Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights in Litigation,

23 SrAN. L. Rv. 473 (1971); Comment, Decency and
Fairness:An EmergingJudicial Role in Prison Reform,
57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971). Note, Administrative Fairness in Corrections, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 587.
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I. TnE CouRTs AND THE PRISONS-AN OVERVIEW

Judicial intervention is a recent phenomenon in
the correctional field. The judiciary has traditionally hesitated to become involved in cases
concerning the administration of internal prison
affairs. Typical of such judicial restraint was the
Supreme Court's statement that "[f]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." 6The courts felt obliged to
defer to the greater expertise which prison administrators were presumed to have in these
matters3. Nor was the judiciary eager to undertake
the burden of continuing supervision of prison
administration.8
In recent years, however, the courts have replaced this passive restraint with cautious scrutiny
and intervention. This reversal of the traditional
stance was heralded by the Sixth Circuit's nowfamous dictum that "[a] prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him by law." 9 Originally, courts would only
depart from the hands-off doctrine when they
found the prison's actions to be arbitrary or
capricious, 10 but eventually they began to consider challenges to prison officials' exercise of
traditional powers. n
A summary review of recent judicial decisions
concerning prison discipline and inmate rights
will place the Morris decision in its proper developmental context. 2 A fundamental decision in this
evolution was Ex parte Hull,13 in which the
Supreme Court declared that prison officials could
6Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).

7See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Morris v. Radio Sta-

tion WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
8See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951): "We reject the argument that any such burden of supervision may lawfully
be imposed upon, or assumed by, the courts." 187
F.2d at 851.
9Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1944).
10Conklin v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1971).
11
See Kimball & Newman, supra note 5, at 3.
12For an extensive account of judicial intervention
in prisons, see Kimball & Newman, supra note 5;
Turner, supra note 5; Jacob, Prison Discipline and
Inmate Rights, 5 HARv. Cirv. RIGHTs-Crv. LiB. L. REv.

227 (1970).
13312 U.S. 546 (1941). "[Ihe state and its officers
may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Id.
at 549.

not deny inmates access to the judicial process.
This critical right of access 14 has since been extended so as to invalidate prison regulations
which placed excessive limitations on the preparation of legal documents, 1 on the types of library
materials -available,"1 and on the assistance of
7
jail-house lawyers.
Moreover, courts have recently intervened
vigorously when correctional officials interfered
with inmates' fundamental first amendment
rights. Fear of institutional disruption, often
posited as a determinative justification for limiting
prisoners' rights,"s was found insufficient to override
an inmate's right to exercise his freedom of religion, in the absence of "a clear and present dangei
of a breach of prison security or discipline or some
other substantial interference with the orderly
functioning of the institution." '1 Courts have
upheld the right to receive religious publications, 20
correspond with ministers to obtain spiritual
advice,' and meet together to worship." Inmates
have attempted to secure freedom from institutional censorship and interference with correspondence, 2' and to establish a right to adequate
'4 See Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.
1963): "[R]easonable access to the courts is basic to
all other rights..., for it is essential to their enforcement."
"5See, e.g., Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1969).
"6See, e.g., Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp 105 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nor. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
17Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (If a lawyer
is not available, a prisoner has a right to ask a fellow
inmate to assist him in formulating a plea for relief).
"8Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (Court took judicial notice of
studies showing that Muslims cause trouble in prison,
with violence as a likely consequence).
19Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968).
But see In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417
(1961).
2"See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir.
1969).
"1See id. See also Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d
531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1963).
"2Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); see
Shaw v. McGinnis, 14 N.Y.2d 864, 200 N.E.2d 636,
2512 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1964).
3Courts are divided as to whether prison officials
should be permitted to open legal correspondence.
Most courts would probably permit this procedure, but
some courts protect confidentiality, especially since
prison officials may be the defendants in upcoming
litigation. See Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D.
Mass. 1971); Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402
(M.D. Fla. 1971); Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162
(D. Me. 1971) (can open mail from an attorney to
inspect for contraband only in prisoner's presence). See
also Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 78591 (D.R.I. 1970) (search warrant required before
inmate outgoing mail can be opened).
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medical treatment, 24 conjugal visits,2 5 and racial
26

integration of prison and jail facilities.
With increasing frequency prisoners' claims
have focused on the internal prison disciplinary
process. 27 Formerly, courts had held that inmate
discipline was a matter of administrative dis28
cretion with which they would not interfere.
Despite inmate complaints of cruel and unusual
punishment, courts had upheld practices such as
whippings with cat-o-nine tails, 29 other forms of
corporal punishment, 0 segregation,n and solitary
24Inmates are entitled to medical care while in
prison, Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.
1966), but no judicial relief will be given if the prisoner
disagrees with the treatment chosen by the prison
physician, Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392
(10th Cir. 1968), if the treatment has been delayed,
Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970), or
even if gross negligence by the physician is charged,
Owens v. Alldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Okla.
1970). Only treatment which is not recognized by any
medical authority will provoke judicial intervention,
Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo.
1970); Veals v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo.
1968). However, if there is a difference of opinion between the physician and prison officials, the officials
have the burden of proving that their purposes could
not be adequately served without jeopardizing the
patient's health, Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690
(D.5Neb. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971).
" See Payne v. District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867
(D.C.
26 Cir. 1958).
See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.
Ala. 1966), a.ff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1967) (per curiam);
Montgomery v. Oakley Training School, 426 F.2d 269
(5th Cir. 1970); Board of Managers of Arkansas
Training School v. George, 377 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.
1967). Cf. Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.
Va. 1963).
2 While we have found no case challenging the types
of misconduct for which an inmate may be disciplined,
there have been numerous suits challenging the
legitimacy of the punishment given and the procedures
employed in arriving at disciplinary determination.
See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), afftd, 442 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1971) (class action
under eighth and thirteenth amendments); Graham v.
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967) (segregated
confinement alleged to be cruel and unusual punishment); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956) (action for damages).
28See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.
1952); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); Graham v. Willingham, 384
F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967).
29 In re Candido, 31 Hawaii 982 (1931).
30See Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Ark. 1965) (whipping is not cruel and unusual punishment per se, but corporal punishment must not be excessive and must be applied by recognizable standards); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956) (inmate may have a state
cause of action for beatings by prison officials, but
no federal right has been violated).
31Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir.
1967).
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confinement. 2 Recently, however, courts have
granted relief from these and similar punishments.
In Jackson v. Bishop,3 for example, Judge
Blackmun, then speaking for the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, enjoined any use of-the strap or
any other corporal punishment as violative of the
eighth amendment. Other courts have recently
enjoined the use of "dry" cells 34 and "strip" cells
which did not meet cleanliness standards.35 Indeed,
some courts have gone even further. In Holt v.
Sarver, 6 the federal district court declared that
conditions in the Arkansas penitentiary system
were so bad that any confinement of persons
there violated the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.
This new judicial inclination toward intervention has also been extended to abuses of the
prison disciplinary process. To date, several
federal decisions have been concerned with the
promulgation of broad procedural rules in this
area. In Sostre v. Rockefeller,r Judge Motley
responded to the segregation of an inmate in a
form of solitary confinement for over one year
by imposing requirements of written notice, a
recorded hearing before a disinterested official,
representation by retained counsel or an appointed
counsel-substitute at the disciplinary hearing,
direct and cross-examination of witnesses, and a
decision supported by a written rationale. The
Second Circuit reversed on appeal, reasoning that
Judge Motley was wrong to conclude that each of
the procedural elements incorporated in her
injunction was constitutionally required. The
court of appeals did recognize, however, that
punishment probably could not be imposed without satisfying a prisoner's right to confront his
accusers, to be informed of evidence against him,
and to a reasonable opportunity to explain his
actions.n
32Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970),
aff'd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
33404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).

34See Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D.
Tenn. 1969).
35 See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966).
16309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
31312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub
noam. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, -U.S.- (1972) Cf. Burns v. Swenson, 288
F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1968), where the court approved
new prison disciplinary procedures as constitutionally
sufficient. In a subsequent modification, the court
withdrew the approval and left the issue undecided.
300 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
3 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, -U.S.(1972).

19721

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRISON DISCIPLINE

In Nolan v. Scafati, Judge Wyzanski declared
in dictum that due process required
that before serious penalty is imposed... the authorities must (1) advise the prisoner of the charge
of misconduct, (2) inform the prisoner of the nature
of the evidence against him, (3) give him an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and (4)
reach its determination on the basis of substantial
evidence 4 0
The First Circuit remanded on appeal, avoiding
the determination of precisely which procedural
safeguards were necessary for such disciplinary
action.- More recently, however, two other
district courts have imposed similar procedural
safeguards on prison disciplinary hearings.42
Whether or not these opinions are affirmed on
appeal, or follow the decisions in Sostre and Nolan,
the cautious attitude of the Second Circuit with
regard to judicial intervention in prison disciplinary
processes is worthy of note:
It would be mere speculation for us to decree that
the effect of equipping prisoners with more elaborate constitutional weapons against the administration of discipline by prison authorities would
be more soothing to the prison atmosphere and rehabilitative of the prisoner or, on the other hand,
more disquieting and destructive of remedial
39 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969) (Petitioner Nolan
had asked for the right to counsel, cross-examination,
and to call witnesses. Judge Wyzanski ruled that these
specific safeguards were not constitutionally required
and that the interest of security in preserving the
authority of prison officials in the maintenance of
prison discipline generally outweighed whatever
advantages
might attend the granting of such rights).
40
Id. at 3.
41430 F.2d 548 1st Cir. (1970).
42 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (When accused of an offense that could
result in criminal penalties, prisoner must be given
Miranda warnings, counsel, and the right to call and
cross-examine witnesses. When serious internal sanctions could be imposed, prisoner has a right to detailed
notice seven days before a hearing before an impartial
fact-finder who is not a material witness or a member of
a reviewing authority, to counsel or prison-appointed
counsel-substitute, to call and cross-examine witnesses,
to a written decision, and to notice of appeal procedures,
where permitted); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971) (Within 48 hours of the offense, the
prisoner should be given notice of a hearing to be held
within 72 hours of the offense before an impartial
tribunal, at which voluntary inmate or staff assistance
will be available. For minor infractions, a written
summary of the proceedings and reason for decision
will be provided, with a right to appeal within three
days. For major violations, witnesses may be called
and cross-examined if the tribunal thinks this is
practical and relevant. A written report and decision
based on substantial evidence will be provided and the
warden will review all cases involving major violations).

ends- This a judgment entrusted to state officials,
not federal judges.
We are particularly unwilling to interfere with
state administrative processes when reliable, detailed information or empirical studies are as
scanty as they are on the subject of prison disciplinary procedures.43
Even where the courts do intercede, the effects
of judicial intervention may not always be salutary. Prison officials may view judicial involvement
as a serious threat to their authority.1 Moreover, a
decision adverse to the prison administration may
create a new assortment of disciplinary problems,
by undermining inmate respect for prison officials.
Inmates, having the court's sympathy, may think
that the ultimate arbiter of the disciplinary process
is the court and not the prison officials. Consequently inmate discipline as well as staff morale
may decline substantially.
We shall examine below the extent to which these
detrimental effects were experienced at the Rhode
Island Adult Correctional Institution after the
entry of Judge Pettine's decree in Morris. In
addition, we shall consider the difficulties of
insuring compliance with a judicial decree-a task
which may require extensive judicial supervision.
Given the present overcrowding of court dockets,
and the limitations on judicial time, one must ask
whether such court supervision is an efficient or
even practicable expenditure of judicial resources.
EI.TH Morris CASE Am
E RHODE IsrLAD
CoRRECTIoNAL INSTITUTION-THE SETTING
The litigation in the case of Morris v. Travisono s
grew out of a request by inmate Morris for investigation of conditions at the Behavior Control
Unit (BCU) 6 in the Adult Correctional Institution
(ACI), where he was incarcerated. As a result of
that investigation, Rhode Island Legal Services
attorneys applied to Judge Pettine for immediate
relief for twenty-four inmates, who had been
confined to the BCU primarily because they had
participated in an inmate strike, and who were, it
was alleged in the complaint, living in conditions so
polluted with filth, rotten food, and human excrement as to be a severe health hazard. After obtaining an agreement which resulted in the removal
of the immediate health hazard,2 Rhode Island
43Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, -U.S.(1972).
4See Kimball & Newman, supra note 5, at 4.
45310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
46
The BCU is a detention facility segregated from
the rest of the Rhode Island institution.
47310 F. Supp. at 858.
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Legal Services amended and expanded their
complaint so that it constituted a broad attack
upon the disciplinary procedures at the ACI. 4
Finally, after weeks of negotiation by the parties
and consideration by the court, a consent decree
was entered by Judge Pettine based on a proposed
draft of "Regulations Governing Disciplinary and
Classification Procedures" submitted and agreed
to by the parties.4 9
The ACI is the only prison in the State of Rhode
Island for adult male convicts, both short-term
and long-term offenders. It is comprised of a
Maximum Custody Facility, Medium and Minimum Custody Facility, Admission and Orientation
Unit, Awaiting Trial Unit, and the Work Release
Unit. 50 Judge Pettine's order applied to all inmates
incarcerated after conviction, that is, to all but
those in the Awaiting Trial Unit. 51 Approximately
360 inmates are affected by the order at any
one time.
III. FINDINGS-THE PROCEDURAL MODEL

judge Pettine's consent decree was aimed at
insuring

fairness

in

the plison's

disciplinary

2

proceedings' by establishing a variety of procedural safeguards. This "procedural due process" "1
41 The amended complaint was filed as a class action
on behalf of all the prisoners at ACI and a sub-class
action on behalf of those inmates in the BCU.
49 Prior to entering the consent decree, the court
heard the views of a number of inmates in court,
distributed to all inmates a copy of the proposed
procedures and provided opportunity for responsethe court received 113 responses out of an inmate
population of approximately 360-and consulted
penologists with national experience. The court then
entered its decision giving "due weight to the justifiable
criticisms of the plaintiff class, to the very real interests
of the defendant prison administration in an ordered
prison environment, and to the commentary received
from the aforementioned penologists." 310 F. Supp. at
860. The court retained jurisdiction for eighteen
months, which period Judge Pettine felt would "allow
the parties to get into a working scheme of enforcement
of the Regulations but [would] also permit enough
flexibility for necessary rule changes." Id. at 862.

"0ANNUAL REPORT: ADULT CORREcTIONAL INSTITURHODE ISLAND 1 (July 1, 1970) [hereinafter
cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
51310 F. Supp. at 864.
Two sets of disciplinary proceedings are held each
week at ACI-one for those inmates in the mediumminimum section, and the other, for the maximum
security prisoners.
53The procedures needed to provide "due process" or
"fairness" vary from case to case:
'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact
boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts .... Whether
the Constitution requires that a particular right
obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a
TIONS,

complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged

right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and

[Vol. 63

approach is one which many courts have taken in
attempting to balance the need for administrative
discretion with the individual's right to protect his
interests from governmental interference." In
this section, we shall examine the AMorris order's
major procedural provisions and, with respect to

each of them, consider the following questions:
1. What was the situation at the ACI with regard to the particular problem prior to the
entry of the order?
2. What weie the explicit provisions of the
order which were designed to meet the
particular problem area?

3. What effect did the pertinent provision of the
order have? To what extent was the provision
implemented?

4. Could the specific provision have been improved to better meet this problem area?
5. What alternative means are available to deal
with the problem?°
A. Notice of the Charges
For the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings,
the order requires that an inmate violation report
be completed which details the alleged violation,
and that both oral and written notice be given to
the inmate of the disciplinary infraction with which
he is charged. Notice is required, apparently not
only to establish the precise nature of the offense
and to inform the inmate fully of the charges, but
also to give him an opportunity to prepare a
5

defense.
These notice provisions met with substantial
compliance." The violation report form serves as
the foundation for the entire proceeding and was
7
almost always filled out.' In the vast majority of
the possible burden on that proceeding, are all
considerations which must be taken into account.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
54See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
5The indictment serves similar purposes in criminal
proceedings, while serving to avoid double jeopardy.
See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
Notice is also a fundamental requisite for civil proceedings. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56 This was not really a new requirement. This
practice was and is known at the ACI as "the book."
Putting a man on "the book" (i.e., charging an inmate
with a disciplinary infraction) has for many years
entailed filling out a form with substantially the same

information as that required by the order.
"In only one case, involving two work-release
inmates, was non-compliance observed. However, the
Disciplinary Board dismissed that case because of the
invalid procedure.
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cases, oral notice was given the inmate when he
was booked." Written notice consisted of a copy of
the violation report form, and, when given,59 was
presented to the inmate by the classification
counselor,60 usually on the day following the
booking.
The notice, especially the description of the
alleged violation, was generally very cursory. The
charge was stated, but the circumstances surrounding the incident were rarely given.6 Names
were often misspelled, the writing sometimes illegible,u and the continuation of a single incident
was often written up on two or three separate
forms as distinct charges3 with the times of
infractions only minutes apart. Any or all of these
factors could contribute to the inmate's confusion
about the charges against him.
There is little question that notice is essential to
a fair disciplinary proceeding, both to inform the
inmate of the nature of the charges against him
and to establish a basis for the subsequent proceedings. Although these provisions required a
substantial amount of paperwork, there was little
staff antagonism, probably because most of the
work was already required at the ACT. However,
the substance of the notice was, at times, insufficient," which seems to indicate the necessity for

staff training in filling out the forms6" and communicating its contents to the inmates. The
inmate violation report form should give as much
detail as possible about the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation, and those staff
members responsible for giving notice to the
inmate should carefully explain the charges to him,
see that he understands them, and advise the
inmate to keep a copy of the violation report form
for reference. In addition, all charges arising out of
a single incident should be noted in the same
report form.
These recommendations should make the report
forms more useful for administrative purposes and
more informative to the inmates. Any added work
may create some staff resistance, but it should be
possible to overcome this by a well-planned training
66
program.
B. PrehearingDetention
One of the primary objectives of the new regulations was to limit the use of inmate detention
prior to a Disciplinary Board hearing to exceptional
cases only, with such detention conducted in a
"non-punitive" manner. However, the lack of
clarity in defining an "exceptional" case fostered
abuse of that basic objective.7 The following
description of one monitored case may illustrate
more vividly the problems of prehearing detention,
and the confusion in the order on this topic.
An inmate came before the Disciplinary Board
having been booked for three separate offenses.

IsA common exception to this practice was that
notice was rarely given to those booked for intoxication
until the next day, on the theory that at the time of the
bookings these inmates were not capable of comprehending
why they were charged.
5
9 While the study's observers had the impression
from monitoring the hearings that written notice was
65The staff training aimed at implementing the
generally given, of fourteen interview respondents
disciplined after the order, eight said that they had not Morris decree was negligible-generally, limited to
received any written notice. Although we have no distribution of the decree to all staff members along
evidence either to support or refute those particular with instructions to read it.
respondents, our feeling is that their answers are not
66As in all areas of institutional reform, the reasons
representative of the practice employed at the ACI. and the necessity for the increased investigatory
However, those eight answers may reflect a failure on information report requirement must be carefully
the inmate's part to understand the notice actually explained to the guards.
61The rules concerning pre-hearing detention are
given or may result from the insufficiency of the notice
itself.
unclear in several respects. (1) They are confusing as
60For a discussion and analysis of the classification to whom may authorize prehearing detention-officer,
counselor's role, see note 78 infra.
superior officer, or superior officer with immediate sub61 This violation record is crucial, not only for the
sequent review. (2) They are confusing as to the necinmate's information but because the violation report essary criteria for imposing pre-hearing detention. One
form serves as the basis for the entire disciplinary provision provides that inmates may be detained "to
proceeding. Since, as will be discussed, the subsequent avoid grave assault or seriousdisorder"; the "emergency"
process of gathering evidence is rather summary, provisions of the rules suggest that there may be a temfailure to record all of the relevant circumstances at porary reassignment of the inmate only when there is an
the time of the initial charge may mean that they will immediale threat to the security or safety of the prison
never receive proper consideration.
as a result of an inmate's serious wrongdoing; while
12 In the few cases involving illegible handwriting,
still another provision suggests that "lock-ups" may be
the charges were dismissed.
appropriate when a threat to order or safety exists as a
' The presence of numerous disciplinary reports in
result of the alleged violation. (3) They do not provide
an inmate's file may affect the future disciplinary standards for judging whether these criteria exist in a
determinations, or even his chances for parole.
particular case. (4) They do not specify the conditions
Some of the difficulty and time may be minimized of the prehearing detention. (5) They are not explicit
by careful design of the form. An experimental revision as to when the specific factual findings leading to the
of the ACI form was designed as a result of this study. lock-up must be recorded and reviewed.
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The first was that he had left his work area without
authority after the officer in charge had refused to
give him a pass to attend his education class after
the inmate had been rude to the officer. The
inmate then was "locked-up" in his cell, pending a
Disciplinary Board hearing of his case. This
"lock-up" was ordered by the superior officer who
had investigated the violation. On the Discipline
Report Form, the superior officer's investigation
said in pertinent part: "[the inmate] ... has a very
negative attitude; he is going to contest his
rights...."
While locked up pending hearing on the charge
of leaving the work area without authorization,
the inmate received two more bookings: one for
playing a guitar in his cell and another for threatening the officer who told him to stop playing his
guitar. Finally, sixteen days after the original
charge, the three charges were presented to the
Disciplinary Board. On the original charge, the
inmate was found guilty and reprimanded, but it
was said that the time he spent locked up in his
cell was sufficient punishment for his misconduct.
Therefore, with respect to that offense, he was
returned to normal status. The inmate was then
asked what he wished to do about the other two
charges which were read to him. The inmate said
that they were without foundation. The Deputy
Warden noted that the officers who made the
charges were on vacation, and asked the inmate if
he wanted the charges heard anyway. [This would
mean pleading guilty. When the inmate contests a
charge, the "booking" officer is called into the
disciplinary board meeting to "verify" the facts.
With the officers absent, the case would have to be
postponed until the officers returned. The inmate
was not aware of this administrative practice, one
which is not provided for in the order.]
The inmate, somewhat confused, commented
again that the "charges were trumped up" and
responded that he would wait until the officers
returned to have the charges heard by the Board.
The immediate reply by the Deputy Warden
without any consideration with the other members
of the Board was, "All right, you will return to your
cell and remain locked up until the officers return."
The inmate left confused and embittered. He
had chosen to postpone the hearings because the
officers were not present and the Deputy Warden
had just finished telling him he would return to
normal status. Now he was to remain locked up
with no idea as to when the Disciplinary Board
would have a hearing on the other two charges.
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In locking up the inmate, the superior officer
was acting presumably pursuant to provision
II.H. of the court order:
H. Only a superior officer shall have authority to
order an inmate locked up pending a Disciplinary
Board hearing. If this is done, it must not be in
accordance with punitive segregation regulations....
This provision includes no explicit criteria for when
a superior officer can exercise this discretion.
However, in provision I.E., there is brief mention
of such criteria for "locking up" a prisoner:
E. When a threat to orderor safety is, in an officer's
opinion, present as a result of the alleged violation, a
superior officer shall determine whether the inmate should be released or held pending further
investigation. (Emphasis added)
As a result of this lock-up, the inmate is confined
to his cell with his work eligibility suspended.
However, it should be noted that under the emergency or temporary provisions of the rules, the
requirements for such reassignments are expressed
in more stringent terms than the requirements for
lock-up pending a Disciplinary Board hearing:
When faced with an immediate threat to the security or safety of the ACI or any of its employees
or inmates, officials of the institution may temporarily reassign inmates in accordance with the
following regulations:
I. Reassignment by a correctional officer on approval of his immediate supervisor:
A. When a correctional officer or other employee
witnesses an inmate commit a serious wrong
doing .... (emphasis added)
In addition to the "immediate threat" and
"serious wrong doing" requirements, unlike the
situation in "lock-ups," a written record of the
reassigment must be forwarded to the Warden and
the Deputy Warden for approval or disapproval.
Furthermore, such reassignments are to be reviewed at the next sitting of the Classification
Board, which is to take place not longer than one
week from the date of the reassignment. No such
review is required for regular lock-ups. Therefore,
although it appears that "lock-up pending a
disciplinary board hearing" and "temporary
reassignments" under the emergency provisions
of the rules result in the same segregation (i.e.,
confinement to cell) and treatment of the inmate
(with the possible exception that under the emer-
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gency temporary reassignment an inmate can
conceivably be placed in punitive segregation
while this is not permitted under the "lock-up"
provisions), lock-up can be effected without
meeting the emergency requirements of immediate
threat to the safety or security of the ACI and
without the subsequent review necessary for
temporary reassignment.
This confusion in the regulations may account
in part for the fact that, contrary to the apparent
intention of the consent decree, the incidence of
prehearing detentions after the entry of the decree
remained about the same as it had been before.,,
Perhaps another reason is that such detention may
really be necessary in many cases. While the
regulation's standards were somewhat unclear, it is
apparent that the main purpose of prehearing
detention is to segregate the inmate from the rest
of the population when it appears that the alleged
violation makes him a threat to himself, to others,
or to the security of the institution. 9 In the context
of a prison setting, with its close quarters and
substantial numbers of people with previous
histories of violence, it is very possible that almost
any irregular incident can be seen as a likely threat
and a potential spark to serious disturbances.
Certainly, the prediction of future trouble, even in
the relatively immediate future, is highly speculative,70 but overprediction in the prison setting,
and therefore overdetention, might be more
0 The study's findings in this respect, based on a
review of 460 disciplinary records, revealed that prior
to the decree 57% of the inmates charged were detained
prior to receiving a hearing and that after the decree
51% were so detained. Similarly, based on interviews
with a sample of 26 inmates, the findings showed that
before the decree 85% received prehearing detention
and after the consent decree 77% were detained before a
hearing. Analysis of the hearings actually monitored
by our observers (all after the decree) also revealed a
high proportion of prehearing detentions-in 38 of the
58 cases observed (65%).
69Contrast this purpose with that of pretrial detention in non-prison society, which is ostensibly to assure
the defendant's presence for trial. The "threat"
criterion in the prison setting is more like the "dangerousness" standard which has been advocated for
preventive detention and which some say is the real
basis of the present detentions under the bail system.
See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in
Bail, 113-U. PA. L. R1v. 960 (1965); Comment, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv.
Civ. RsioTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 289 (1971); Comment,
PretrialDetention in the District of Columbia: A Common Law Approach, 62 J. Caum. L.C. & P.S. 194, 199,
203 (1971). Packer, Two Models of tle Criminal Process,70113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-44 (1964).
See Comment Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, supra note 69 at 324-32.

justified than on the outside because of the potentially volatile nature of penal institutions.
This does not mean, however, that there should
be no limits on prehearing detention. The nature of
the threat and the reason for detention should be
clearly specified in writing and such detentions
should be subject to immediate review. In addition, the nature of the confinement should be as
dose to normal incarceration as possiblen and the
disciplinary hearing on the alleged infraction
should be held as soon as possibleY2 If the inmate's
threat to the institution has abated, he should be
released pending his hearing. Moreover, in disposing of the alleged violations, the Disciplinary
Board should consider any time spent in detention
prior to the hearing.73 Staff training as to when
prehearing detention should be invoked and in
what manner is crucial.
C. SuperiorO~icer'sInvestigation
The superior officer's investigation 74 is another
important aspect of the decree; the Disciplinary
Board relies heavily on it in its consideration of
the caseY5 Our study revealed that the superior
71
The study found that most inmates detained prior
to hearing were locked up in their own cells. Of the 31
monitored cases involving prehearing detention on
which there was information concerning the place of
detention, in 22 of them (71%), the inmate had been
detained in his own cell. Other locations included the
following: admission and orientation cell (3); hospital
cell, a form of punitive segregation (2); cell block in
medium-minimum (2); hole, a form of segregation (1);
unemployed, locked up in own cell, but only during
day (1).
721n order to reduce the hardship of prehearing
detention, the hearings should normally be held within
one day of the initial charge. Weekends and holidays
may necessitate a forty-eight hour delay. The study
found that prehearing detentions were usually for a
considerably longer period of time, although after the
consent decree the detention period slightly decreased.
Besides the fact that there was not a general decrease
in the length of prehearing detention after the entry of
the decree, there were still postderee cases in which
the detention prior to hearing was more than one week.
,3The study revealed that the Disciplinary Board
at the ACI did consider the prehearing detention in
their dispositions in a large number of cases. In 43% of
the cases prior to the decree the Board considered
prehearing detention as punishment; after the decree,
25% were considered as punishment.
74Of the approximately 152 correctional officers at
the ACI, 17 of them are superior officers (six captains
and eleven lieutenants). Above them are the two deputy
wardens, each of whom has responsibility for one of the
two facilities-maximum and medium-minimum. The
deputy wardens preside at the disciplinary meetings.
Their immediate superior is the assistant warden.
75Many penal institutions rely heavily on the
investigative process for fact-finding, while the board
hearings are more dispositional in nature. This alloca-
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officer's investigation was in most cases quite
7
summary and the reports often very inadequate. 6
In many incidents there were no witnesses, but
even in those in which there were, rarely was
anyone except the charging officer and the inmate
interviewed. In most cases, the summary of the
investigation amounted to one sentence stating
either whether the inmate admitted the offense or
whether the superior officer thought the inmate was
guilty. In addition, the superior officer frequently
gave his opinion (usually negative) of the inmate's
attitude, and, in a few cases, he gave his view of the
proper sentence. The superior officer's report
seldom shed any light on the facts of the incident
itself or the circumstances surrounding it. The
inadequacy of the reports is probably due to a
number of reasons: a lack of training regarding the
significance of these investigations, a resistance to
additional paper work, and, perhaps most important, a feeling that theie is no need for more,
since the Board has generally found these quite
summary reports sufficient for its purposes. The
cursory nature of the superior officer's investigation is a corollary to the subsequent de-emphasis
of the fact-finding process by the Disciplinary
Board.7
D. Representation
The Morris decree mandated classification
counselors as the representatives of the inmate at
the Disciplinary Board hearingYs The decree makes
the counselor responsible for transmitting the
written notice of the chaiges and hearing to the
tion of trial functions is more like that of the civil law
countries than of our criminal process, which, in
theory at least, concentrates the fact-finding function
at the trial stage. Cf. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767, 774 (N.D. Cal 1971) ("Most of the time
spent by the [disciplinary] committee in deliberation is
devoted to directing what disposition to take rather
than
7 6 ascertaining guilt or innocence").
In almost all cases the space on the form for the
superior officer's report was filled in, although there
were some forms in which that space was left blank.
77See text accompanying note 106 infra for a detailed discussion of the de-emphasis of the fact-finding
process.
7
8 The classification counselor is the social worker of
the ACI. At the time of the study there were four
classification counselors, only three of whom were
responsible for "counseling." Because of other administrative responsibilities, these men spend a relatively
small amount of their time actually counseling inmates. Since the time of the study, the classification
department has been expanded somewhat, but not
sufficiently so that the counselors can perform the
"garbage details" and still adequately counsel the
inmates.
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inmate, for informing the inmate of his right to

have a counselor assist him at the hearing, and for
assisting the inmate on appeal if he is dissatisfied
with the Board's decisionY9
The experience at the ACI in making the correctional staff responsible for serving as inmates'
advocates in disciplinary proceedings is instructive.
At the hearings themselves, classification counselors generally seemed to play an extremely
limited role. This might be due to the fact that
the defense was usually an outright denial, and
the result often rested on the question of credibility, the officer's against the inmate's. Usually
though, the counselors were reluctant to become
ardent advocates for inmates in the disciplinary
hearings. Our staff interviews indicated that the
reason for this reluctance was the conflict they felt
between their role as advocate for the inmates and
their role as a member of the prison staff:
There's a basic conflict-we are caught between
the inmate and the rest of the staff. If we win a
case for him, the staff resents it; if we lose, he resents us.
There is also a problem in that the counselor is
resented by the staff when an inmate he represented at a disciplinary board hearing is found not
guilty.
Classification Counselors are confused as to how
they should act. They are required to be something
between a lawyer and a social worker.
At the same time, almost all the inmates in the
interview sample said they were dissatisfied with
the counselor's representation at the hearingPs
79The following percentages, based on interview
responses of a sample of 14 inmates, describe the extent
to which the classification counselor (CC) was used
as a representative after the entry of the decree: Told
of right to CC (72%); Requested CC (57%); CC
present at hearing (83%); Told of right to CC on
appeal (50%); Requested CC on appeal (58%).
8°The most common reasons given for this dissatisfaction were that the counselor "didn't do anything" or was "no help." One inmate complained that
he didn't see the counselor before the hearing and
another, perhaps reflecting the counselor's dual role,
said that the counselor had helped to put the blame on
him.
Of course, dissatisfaction with counsel is common
throughout the criminal process, even among defendants having privately retained counsel. But the
dissatisfaction is almost assured when counsel is seen
as part of the disciplining system. This was especially
true at the ACI, where the effect of the consent decree
was not only to make the counselor an advocate, but
also to put him on the Disciplinary Board. The decree
required that a member of the treatment staff be on
the board: classification counselors comprised the bulk
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An alternative to using correctional staff for
representational purposes might be to use outside
counsel,"' but this, also, presents a number of
problems. Outsiders, especially those assuming
an adversary role, are often viewed with hostility
and suspicion by the staff. Their "interference"
in prison affairs is resented, and they are seen as a
threat by the staff, who fear any undermining of
their authority and the possibility of civil liability
suits against them.P These fears might lead the
of treatment personnel, and they were selected. This
put the counselor in conflicting roles, a conflict which
the counseling staff has sought to avoid by petitioning
Judge Pettine for a change in the decree. In their
petition, dated October 1, 1970, the Classification
Department staff articulated these problems:
The issue at hand is a fundamental one in our
role as counselors. Simply stated, whenever a
Classification Counselor sits in judgment of an
inmate (as he does when sitting on an institutional Disciplinary Board), the counselor is put in
the position of jeopardizing his relationship with
inmates and decreasing the possibility of effecting
positive change in behavior on the part of inmates,
e.g., if a counselor sits on a Disciplinary Board
which sends one of his inmate counselees to segregation for five days, the possibility of the counselor
afterwards establishing or continuing a meaningful
relationship in terms of helping the inmate achieve
positive behavioral change is practically nil.
The effect of the counselor's sitting on the Disciplinary Board extends beyond those cases which
involve an inmate who is part of that particular
counselor's caseload. The mere fact of the counselor's presence on the Board puts him in the role
of disciplinarian which is antithetical to his role
of counselor. We feel this issue is too critical to be
resolved by characterizing Classification Counselors
as individuals who must function in many roles,
some of which are in conflict with others.
81While the right to counsel has been extended to
any "critical" stage of the criminal process, see, e.g.,
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary
hearing before magistrate); it has not as yet been
dearly applied to the peno-correctional process; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment).
Compare Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (probation-deferred sentencing proceeding) with Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (parole revocation
hearing). But see Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (right to counsel for
prison disciplinary proceedings when offense could also
result in criminal charges). See generally Cohen,
Sentencing, Probation,and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The
View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1968);
Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert Counsel in the
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MrqN. L. REv. 803
(1961).
6242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), a part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, makes anyone acting under color of state
law, who deprives another citizen of a right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution, liable at law, in
equity or other proper proceeding. This section has
already been the basis for a major portion of prisoners'
suits against prison officials. See Note, Prisoners'
Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo. L. J. 1270 (1969).

staff to bypass the formal disciplinary process,
where they would be subjected to counsel's investigation and interrogation, either by disciplining
the inmates informally or by ignoring infractions
of the prison rulesPn Outside counsel is also resisted
because of a fear that Board pioceedings will be
transformed into criminal trials. A number of staff
members felt that the decree already went too far
in that respect:
The fallacy is in instituting court procedures in the
ACI hearings. We are not a court.... There are
too many confusing technicalities in the order.
The entire order is wrong as to discipline. The
system should not be so formal. The average inmate is glad to get his court appearance over. He
can then relax and do his time. However, with the
new system, it is like he is always going back to
court. The average inmate doesn't want to bother
with such a formal systemM
Moreover, if retained counsel were permitted,
equal protection problems would be raised regarding indigent inmates who could not afford
such counsel s5 Finally, given the institutional
de-emphasis on the entire fact-finding process,
legal representation at Board hearings may not in
fact be necessary in all disciplinary cases. To
provide for such legal representation in particular
cases8 6 would be tantamount to refocusing the
disciplinary inquiry.
E. DisciplinaryHearing-The DisciplinaryBoard
1. Conposition of the Board. The Morris decree
required that the Disciplinary Boards in both the
maximum and medium-minimum security inFor a discussion of staff practice of bypassing the
formal disciplinary process, see note 155 infra and
accompanying text.
84 The judicialization of disciplinary procedures was
criticized by some of the staff not only because of the
complexity of the rules or because it might bring some
of the court's problems, such as judicial backlog, to the
institution, but also because there was a feeling, as
one staff member said, that, "the decree is directed
toward punishment" rather than rehabilitation.
85 For applications of the equal protection clause in
other criminal contexts, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). In Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th
Cir. 1969), the court recognized that if retained counsel
were permitted by statute to be present at parole
revocation hearings, then indigents must also be given
counsel.
appointed
16 In Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767
(N.D. Cal. 1971), the court required that counsel be
given to prisoners accused of an offense which could
result in criminal penalties.
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stitutions have three members, consisting of the
Deputy Warden of the particular facility and two
members "selected from the custody and treatment departments." This provision was interpreted as requiring one member from custody and
one from treatment, and these requirements were
almost always met.87
The compositional provision of the decree was
subjected to substantial criticism by both staff and
inmates. The staff problem of having to use classification counselors (who were also supposed to
represent inmates) on the Board to meet the
treatment member requirement, has already been
discussed.P On the other hand, the inmates simply
felt that the Board was unfairly constituted. In
citing the composition of the Board as the most
unfair aspect of the disciplinary process at the
ACI,9 the inmates characterized the board as a
"kangaroo court" and a "biased board" which
did not "know how to be fair." They alleged that
the Board members held "grudges" and showed
favoritism, and they particularly criticized the
presence of guards on the Board 0 as well as the
absence of blacks, in alleging racial prejudice.
The impartiality of the Disciplinary Board may
be impeded by several factors. In a small, dosed
institution like the ACI, staff members are familiar
with many of the inmates and usually bring to the
Board hearings a great deal of personal knowledge
about a particular inmate and sometimes bias,
either favorable or unfavorable, toward him. The
result often is that the disciplinary decision is made
on the basis of the personal and usually unarticu17The decree was not interpreted as requiring the
same three people for every Board hearing. Therefore,
the custodial position was filled by any number of
guards and superior officers. Similarly, while the
treatment position was usually assumed by a classification counselor, there were times when a male nurse,
teacher, or shop instructor served in that capacity.
The Deputy Warden was almost always present; in his
absence, the captain-the highest ranking correctional
officer-presided over the meeting.
81See note 78 supra.

19Inmates in the interview sample who had been
disciplined were asked whether they felt the disciplinary
proceeding was fair. If they responded that it was unfair, the inmates were asked the following questions:
what was unfair about this proceeding? In general, how
can disciplinary proceedings be changed to make them
fairer? In response to these questions, the composition
of the Board was cited most frequently as an unfair
aspect of the disciplinary process.
90Often more than three staff members participated
on the Board. On these occasions, the additional
personnel was usually from the custodial staff. At
times, this gave a marked custodial tone to the Disciplinary Board hearing.
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lated feelings of a staff member, rather than on
the facts presented at the hearing.9 '
Board members may not act impartially because
they feel that their duty is to support the staff in
all cases. As one Board member put it, "The
philosophy in the past has been always back up
your officers, whether they are right or wrong."
Such a view is particularly harmful to the integrity
of the disciplinary process, when, as in most contested hearings, the evidence consists mainly of
conflicting testimony by the prisoner and a staff
member.
Another factor which may affect the disposition
of the case is the inmate's behavior before the
Board. An inmate who is "defiant" or had a
"hard attitude" or insists on his "rights" is unlikely to win the sympathy of the Board.
These factors affecting the Board's decisionspersonal knowledge of, and sometimes bias toward,
the inmate defendant, tendency to support staff,
and reaction to inmate attitude before the
Board"'-combine to make the prison disciplinary
process something less than a hearing before
51 One observed case, for example, presented the
following scenario:
The inmate was charged with refusing to work.
Before the inmate was brought into the hearing
room, a custodial officer on the board said: "These
guys cause problems. They don't want to work. I
recommend B.C.U.... I want to say this before

they come in ....They defy every rule." The
inmate was then brought in, and was subsequently
confined to his cell except for meals and referred
to the Classification Board for reclassification to a
lower status. In the observer's opinion the prehearing conversation had definitely been prejudicial to the inmate.
In another case, a Board member's favorable view
of the inmate helped him:
After the inmate had conceded guilt and had
left the room, the chairman said: "... [He] has a

shot at parole next month, and I don't want to
mess him up... I don't want to foul up his
visits [either], because he gets a lot of good out of
them." The inmate was deprived of five days'
pay [a rather nominal penalty considering that
non-work-release inmates at ACI earn a maximum of one dollar per day].
Also, in a rather paradoxical turn of events, inmates
branded as "trouble-makers" may be treated more
leniently precisely because of their troublesome nature.
Prior to one set of cases, the chairman made the
following comment:
Look, these guys are searching for some way of
causing trouble. Let's follow the rules to the letter
and go as easy as possible on them so they have
nothing to protest about to the court.
92 David Ward's study of inmate discipline in a
federal prison found these same factors at work in their
board proceedings. D.A. Ward, Prison Rule Enforcement and Changing Organization Goals (unpublished
thesis) (1960).
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impartial arbiters based only upon evidence and
argument in open court.93
It may be that some of these problems could be4
solved by changing the composition of the Board.9
The inmates interviewed had numerous suggestions
for such changes: an inmate jury, one inmate on
the Board, the same people on every Board, the
Warden or Assistant Warden on the Board, fewer
guards present, and outsiders on the Board. However, with the possible exception of including an
outsider, these proposals do not seem designed to
create a more impartial Board. It is difficult to see
how a change among prison staff would improve
matters, since almost all prison personnel have
personal knowledge of many of the inmates and
are subject to similar pressures with regard -to
staff support. Even adding inmates to the Board
would not remedy the problem of personal knowledge and possible bias toward the charged prisoners. While the use of an outsider would solve that
difficulty (at least temporarily, i.e., until he gets
to know the inmates), such a move would create a
whole variety of problems, some of which have
already been referred to in connection with the
representation issue, 95 and others of which will be
discussed in more detail below.96
2. Jurisdictionof the Board. The Morris decree
stated that "[only] a duly authorized Disciplinary
Board has the power to issue punishment to
inmates... .,7The question remains, which inmate
actions are subject to punishment? While the
prison has no comprehensive set of rules which
13 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, (1906)
(Holmes, J.). Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23
(1961):
It is not required... that the jurors be totally
ignorant of the facts and issues involved.... It is
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.
9 At a minimum, custodial personnel witnessing or
charging the inmate with the alleged infraction should
disqualify themselves. See Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F.
Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) (official was instrumental in
pressing charges against an inmate and did not disqualify himself from Disciplinary Board, held violation
amendment due process).
of fourteenth
95
ee note 81 supra.
99
See also Bundy v. Cannon,
See note 162 infra.
328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971), where the court
issued regulations similar in scope to those included in
the Morris decree and required that the Disciplinary
Board include a hearing examiner from the office of the
of the Department of Corrections.
Commissioner
97
However, the decree also provided that an officer
or employee observing minor violations should handle
such incidents tactfully and firmly by warning and
counseling. 310 F. Supp. at 871 (1970).

outline the boundaries of permissible conduct,"
there are many regulations concerning such matters
as mail, headcounts, searches, card playing and
gambling, institutional property, television use
and personal hygiene, as well as numerous other
activities and forms of conduct.9 9 These rules,
printed in the Inmate Guide, outline many types of
conduct for which prisoners might be punished.
The study's examination of disciplinary records,
observations of hearings, and interviews with
inmates revealed a broad range of behavior for
which the prisoners were subject to disciplinary
board action, as seen in Table 1.100
The most frequent pattern of misbehavior
involved trouble with the guards and staff, for
example, arguing with the cook, not telling the
guard that someone was out of his cell, or threatening the officer. Almost always, verbal abuse of
an officer by an inmate resulted from an inmate's
feeling that his rights or privileges had been denied
in some way. Only rarely did the inmate go so far
as to threaten the guard with physical harm, and
only once or twice did an inmate actually threaten
a guard with a weapon. Typically, then, there was
no real direct threat of physical harm in the
inmate's action, nor was there any real physical
danger to the institution or its personnel. Basically,
91In the preface to the Inmate Guide, prisoners are
told:
We purposefully have refrained from listing a
series of 'do's' and 'dont's' because we know no
one answer covers all situations or circumstances.
If you enter into the spirit of this guide your
mistakes will be minimal and life here will be
better for others because you have helped to make
it that way.
Inmate Guide, Adult Correctional Institutions, Rhode
Island, (August 15, 1965; revised March 1, 1967).
91Other regulated conduct includes smoking, reading, "horseplay," betting, offensive speech, bobbies and
unnecessary movement during headcounts. Inmates
are required to obey orders of an employee in a cooperative manner and submit to searches of their persons or
quarters. Id. at 18-20. This partial list of regulations
supports the view that because "life in the ordinary
prison has to be lived wholly within walls," few inmate
functions are not regulated. Grosser, External Setting
and InternalRdations of the Prison,in Plisox WITHIN
SocrETv 15 (L. Hazelrigg ed. 1968).
100Tn using the tables which follow, one must
remember that in a few instances the same incident
may occur in more than one sample. Ward's study
indicated similar distributions of infractions: Insolence
(203 cases) (14%); Refusing to work and to obey
direct orders (247) (18%); Fighting (186) (13%);
Contraband (366) (25%); Group Assault, Creating a
Disturbance (65) (4%); Sex, Race, Attempted Escape,
Assaulting an officer (61) (4%); Violation of Movement
Regulations (78) (5%); other (Gambling, Poor Work
Report, Miscellaneous) (99) (7%). Ward, supra note
92, at 109.
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TABLE I
TYPES OF MISCONDUCT FOR WHICH INMUTES ARE BROUGHT BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD
Number of Incidents in Each Sample
Type of Misconduct

Total

Record

Monitored

Interview

141
81
65
35
36
41
36
25
21
14
9
5
3
2
2

9
11
17
12
4
2
4
1

10
8
5
2
5
2
4
1
2-

1

2

Sample

Trouble w. Guard & Staff.............
Fight/Assault & Battery ..............
Refusals ............................
Use and/or Possession of Alcohol, Drugs.
Poss. of Prohibited Articles ............
Creating a Disturbance ...............
Escape .............................
Destruction of State Property .........
Out of Place .........................
Throwing Food Out of Cell ...........
Talking When Not Permitted .........
Carrying a Protest Sign ...............
Fire in Cell ..........................
Larceny of Table ....................
Violating Security Rules ..............
Sharing Bed With Another Inmate .....
Strike ..............................
Suspicion in Stabbing Case, General
Suspicion .........................
Shaving Head .......................
Making a Bomb .....................
Cutting Wrist .......................
Total Infractions ....................

in these situations the inmate failed to obey an
officer's or staff member's order, or, perhaps while
obeying the order, would complain somewhat
abusively about it. For this the inmate was punished, almost always without regard to the substance and validity of the staff member's order.
Other offenses have similar characteristics.
"Refusals" include: refusing to do a certain job or
refusing to give up cigarettes where they were not
allowed. There is usually little inquiry as to whether
an inmate's refusal was justified.'
101The following situations are examples of such
practices: One inmate, brought before the Disciplinary
Board for refusing to -perform a loading job, complained that it wasn't his assignment and that others
who had been ordered to do the loading had refused
and hadn't been punished. The Deputy Warden
chairing the hearing dismissed his plea, stating: "The
only question in my mind is, did you refuse to do what
an officer ordered you to do?"
Another inmate, when ordered to give up his cigarettes on being reclassified to a lower status, refused,
claiming that cigarettes were allowed in that status.
Regardless of the merits of his claim, the refusal was
thought to justify disciplinary action.

Sample

Percentage

Sample

1
1
2
2
2
2
1

160
100
87
49
45
45
44
26
24
14
12
5
4
3
2
2
2

25%
16%
14%
8%
7%
7%
7%
4%
4%
2%
2%
1%
1%

2%

2
2
1
1
630

100%

While the Morris decree did not specifically
resolve the question of what particular patterns of
behavior could be subject to prison discipline,202
our study revealed that inmates were disciplined
for a broad range of actions, suggesting the many
purposes for which a prison disciplinary system is
used. These purposes include the promotion of
staff status and respect, the maintenance of control,
order and security, deterrence, punishment, and at
least theoretically, rehabilitation. Obviously this
multirlicity of purpose may create conflicting
pressures in particular situations, pressures which
1°2The court specifically excluded that point as
"inappropriate to this action [Morris]at this time...
Judge Pettine did note, however, that:
lilt has been contended that standards of substantive wrong for which an inmate can be classified
into a lower category are either non-existant or so
vague as to be meaningless. In essence, this grievance seeks a code of conduct setting out clear but
fair categories for intra-prison anti-social behavior
for which punishment can be given. While the court
has decided to place this grievance beyond the
reach of this case, it is one which should be given
serious consideration.
310 F. Supp. at 861 (1970).
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may require different procedures than those used
in traditional due process proceedings.i °
3. Hearing Procedures. The Morris decree
established the following procedures for conducting
the hearing: reading to the inmate the charges and
the record of the surrounding circumstances;
admission or denial of the charges by the inmate;
interrogation of the inmate by the Board; and
presentation of evidence by the inmate.
In most of the cases observed by our researchers
there was considerable discussion of the case
preceding the inmate's entry into the hearing
room."' 4 Following the inmate's arrival, standard
procedure was to tell the inmate the charge and to
ask him whether he admitted or denied the allegations. If he admitted them, the charge would be
read in full and frequently the sentence would then
be imposed. If he denied the charge, the charging
officer would be called into the room to re-read
the charge to the inmate. There was seldom any
detailed questioning of the officer about the facts
of the case or the circumstances surrounding it.
The inmate was given an opportunity to tell his
version of the incident. While there is no explicit
provision in the decree authorizing the inmate to
call witnesses, on a number of occasions inmates
made such a request and were denied, although one
case was observed in which a witness was permitted.0 5 Generally the classification counselor
rendered limited assistance. After this usually
brief presentation of the evidence, the inmate
would be sent out of the room and disposition
would be discussed, with the chairman's recommendation most often the controlling opinion.
The inmate would then be called back into the
room and told of the Board's decision and the
disposition.
In sum, the disciplinary hearings were very
cursory affairs. The changing and investigative
reports upon which the Board relied almost exclusively presented the circumstances surrounding
the alleged infraction inadequately 6 Furthermore, although only in a minority of the monitored
cases did the inmate deny the charges, when there
were such denials the fact-finding inquiry was
minimal. Even when conflicting factual testimony
103See note 161 infra.
104Often such extensive prior discussion centered
around the Board members' personal knowledge of the
inmate and the circumstances of the alleged infraction.
"I The witness's testimony was disregarded by the
Board in the face of the charging officer's conflicting
testimony.
106 See note 76 supra.

was presented, no attempt was made to probe
more deeply or to reconcile the contradictions.
Perhaps this resulted primarily from fear of calling
into question the charging officer's credibility, a
fear which colors the entire disciplinary process.
If an inmate were found not guilty in the face of an
officer's assertion of the inmate's guilt, the officer
might well take such a finding as an attack on his
truthfulness. Rather than so insult the charging
officer, a prison official with whom each member
of the Disciplinary Board must work and live, the
presumption of credibility is strongly biased
against the inmate or inmate witness in any
contested case.
The real function of the Board is dispositional in
nature. Even in contested cases, with the presumption of credibility so heavily weighted against
the inmate, the Board's fact-finding role is subordinated to its dispositional function. If the
predominant purpose of the Disciplinary Board
were to evaluate an inmate's general progress in
the institution rather than to find facts regarding a
particular alleged offense, errors in fact-finding
might be tolerated. However, where the disposition
is keyed directly to the charged misconduct, as is
ostensibly the case at the ACI, fact-finding is
critical. Indeed, to minimize fact-finding would
tend to reduce inmate morale and confidence in the
integrity of the disciplinary process.
4, Disposition
a. Procedure. As has already been noted, after
the evidence is presented at the hearing, the
inmate leaves the room while the Board discusses
its decision and the appropriate disposition. The
regulations dictate that the Board's decision be
based upon "substantial evidence." While this
requirement might be thought to be useful in
assuring at least a minimum of testimony that
the alleged infraction actually occurred, in practice
there is almost always such evidence because the
officer's testimony usually states sufficient facts to
constitute a prima facie case of inmate violation.107
The decree also specifies that the inmate be
advised of the rationale and consequences of the
Board's decision. Only five of the thirteen inmates
in our interview sample who had been disciplined
107 This is especially true in the absence of any set
list of regulations, since almost any incident could
constitute a violation. Furthermore, given the presumption of credibility against the inmate, see text
accompanying note 76 supra, that Board findings be
based upon "substantial evidence" is an ineffective
standard.
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by the Board said that they were given any explanation at all. The rationale could be extremely
important, both for developing an underlying
philosophy for the disciplinary system and for
explaining apparent inconsistencies in disposition
which tend to be seen by the inmate population as
arbitrary or discriminatory actions. The following
account is an example of the situation prevailing
when the hearings were being monitored:
Three inmates participated in smuggling food
into the institution in violation of an institutional
rule. Two of the inmates, who were clearly accessories to the violation, transferring the food to the receiving inmate, were punished differently. One was
sentenced to three days in punitive segregation and
lost three days' good time, while the other was
merely docked five days' pay (one dollar/day). No
explanation was given as to the reasons for distinguishing between the two in terms of punishment when both had committed the same offense.
A possible explanation is that the one who was
punished more severely was a veteran prisoner who
had several previous disciplinary violations and
who was on work release, while the other inmate
had no disciplinary record. However, no mention
of these factors was made at the hearing. 0)
Requiring the rationale to be written and providing thorough review might well give added
weight to the requirement of substantial evidence.
b. Types of Dispositions. A broad range of
dispositions is used by the Disciplinary Boards at
the ACI. Table 2 describes the number of times
each punishment was used as revealed by our
examination of the records, observations of the
hearings and interviews with the inmates. 1'
Obviously the Disciplinary Board has a broad
range of "sentencing" alternatives at its disposal.
In fact, the Board often uses these dispositions in
108A similar situation obtains in classification hearings where the inmate's job and custodial security
status is determined. At one classification hearing, for
example, all of the inmates sought to have their
security status changed from maximum to minimum in
order to enhance their opportunity for parole. The
first inmate whose case was heard was transferred from
maximum security status to medium status despite
evidence of his good behavior. The warden stressed
that transfer from maximum status to medium status
was the rule, and maximum to minimum status the
exception. In three other cases that morning, inmates
were reclassified directly from maximum to minimum
security status.
109 Ward, using a lesser number of dispositional
categories found the following distribution: Punitive
confinement (692 instances--48%); Restriction of
Privileges and Loss of Good Time (350-24%);
Verbal Penalities and Suspended Sentence (228-16%);
Other (137-9%); No Action (42-3%). Ward, supra
note 92.
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combination. In the examination of our record
samples, 159 different punishment combinations
were discovered. While there is a substantial number of non-punitive as well as punitive options, the
actions taken were essentially punitive ones.
The Morris decree did not limit the types of
punishment which the Board could impose, but
sanctioned the existing types of dispositions and
placed a thirty-day limit on the duration of any
specific punishment." 0 A detailed study of the
cases in the record sample arising after the consent decree indicated that, with only minor exceptions,"' there was substantial compliance with
these limitations. However, subsequent conversations with staff members revealed one or two cases
in which inmates were segregated for longer than
thirty days, although not in the same segregation
area. As a rule, according to our record sample
analysis, punishment seems to have become more
lenient after the decree."' The punishments generally thought to be most severe, i.e., segregation
and loss of good time, comprised only 19% and
7% respectively of the dispositions after the decree.
Before the decree 30% of the dispositions involved
segregation and 15% loss of good time. At the
same time, the 'qighter" dispositions, such as
reprimands, suspensions, and probations increased,
as did the percentage of charges dropped and findings of not guilty, as seen in Table 3. This change,
however, does not necessarily reflect the impact
of the decree, but may be due to the change in
n°The regulations stipulate that the following
actions may be taken by a Disciplinary Board: (1)
Dismissal of Charge; (2) Reprimand; (3) Recommendations to Classification Board for change of
status; (4) Temporary loss of specified privileges within
inmate classification not to exceed thirty days; (5)
One to thirty days placement in punitive segregation;
(6) Referral to Classification Board with recommendation of reclassification plus (5) supra; (7) Loss of good
time as prescribed by law under § 13-3-44 of the
General Laws of Rhode Island; (8) Any combination
of (3) through (7) and/or suspended action on any or
all of (3) through (7).
" Only nine cases were found in which something
other than the punishments described in the regulations
was the stated disposition. In four cases, the inmates
were given 90 days' probation. The decree makes no
mention of probation, although it does allow "suspended
action." The regulations also establish an outer limit
of thirty days on most disciplinary activity. In four
other cases, the disciplinary record indicates that the
inmate was released on bail. In the ninth case, the
record simply indicates that the case was referred to the
warden.
"' For example, some interviewed inmates when
asked for changes caused by the decree responded:
"They're not putting guys in the hole [a form of
segregation] as much," and "the board got easier."
Similarly, a staff member commented that "the
extremes have been eliminated."
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TABLE 2
TYPE OF PUNIS MENT METED OUT BY DISCIPLmARY BoARD
Number of Times Disposition
Used in Each Sample
Total

Type of Disposition

Segregated* ............................
Lost Good Time** ......................
Reprimanded, Suspended Punishment, Probation .............................
Loss of Privileges*** .....................
Referred to Classification Boardf ..........
Kept in Celt ...........................
Transferredlf ...........................
Charges Droppedf ......................
Not Guilty .............................
Other ..................................
Total No. Dispositions .................

Record
Sample

Monitored
Sample

Interview
Sample

189
143

20

21
12

132
82
79
38
38
18
13
16

16
6
3
4

7

4
4

1
14
1
1

230 (27%) "
155 (18%)
155
88
83
56
39
18
18
20

(18%)
(10%)
(10%)
(6%)
(5%)
(2%)
(2%)
(2% )

862 (100%)

* Segregation implies that an inmate is removed from his regular cell or living area and is placed apart from the
general inmate population. The privileges accorded to one in segregation vary from time to time and often from
inmate to inmate and differ according to the particular segregation area in which the inmate is placed.
** All prisoners sentenced to terms of six months and over are eligible for good time deductions ranging from
one to ten days per month depending upon the length of their sentence. These credits are deducted from this
maximum sentence and provide a means for the inmate to bring closer his date of release. However, those good
time credits may be lost as a result of disciplinary action. In many cases where segregation is imposed at the ACI,
good time is also removed automatically. For a discussion of the seriousness of loss of good time and its effect
upon lengthening an inmate's sentence, see Turner, supra note 5.
***Loss of privileges encompasses a wide variety of punishments. An inmate may be deprived of his evening
activities, his job (and pay), and his exercise period. On occasion, inmates have even been deprived of mail, visitation, and chapel privileges. Deprivation of privileges is considered to be a most effective punishment, since it
enables the administration to punish an inmate in the way most particularly meaningful to him. At the same
time, it does not require cutting him off from the rest of the population or extending his sentence.
f Inmates are usually referred to the Classification Board when segregation is thought desirable. In addition,
as a result of the Morris decree, reclassification to a lower status (meaning fewer privileges and more rigid control), while really a disciplinary function, must be decided by the Classification Board.
t The punishment of keeping an inmate in his cell also covers a number of types of discipline. These include
two-night lockups (see note 150 infra), confinement to cell during day, confinement to cell at night, and confinement to a particular area of the prison (e.g., work release area). In all of these situations, the inmate is kept in
his own quarters but is not allowed to leave them at certain periods, as he regularly would.
tf Rather than confining an inmate to his cell, the Board may feel that, for a variety of reasons, the inmate's
difficulties result from his being in one area or another, either for work or for residence. In such cases, the inmate
may be transferred to another job or residence assignment.
tt In a few cases, the charges are dropped. These are not acquittals but rather dismissals for a variety of technical reasons. Sometimes the inmate's sentence will have expired, and he will be discharged before appearing
before the Board. In other cases, particularly after the court's decree, the charge may have been dismissed for
failure to comply with required procedures. These cases are rare and usually indicate a blatant disregard of the
regulations of the decree.
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c. Relationship between dispositions and other
factors. Since no underlying rationale for discipline
at ACI was stated either in prison documents or
Date of Punishment
at the hearings themselves, our study attempted to
Punishment
discover if there were some de facto rationale, by
7/69-3/10/70 3/11/70-10/70
examining the correlations between the disposiAfter
Before
tions and a number of other factors: viz., types of
32 (30%) 44 (19%)
misconduct, custodial classification, and a variety
Segregation ...............
16 (7%)
17 (15%)
Loss of Good Time ........
of "demographic" factors.
Suspended,
Reprimand,
i. Correlation between dispositions and types of
70 (31%)
13 (12%)
Probation ............
misconduct. The study showed little correlation
34 (30%) 37 (16%)
Loss of Privileges ..........
between the type of misconduct with which an
Referred to Classification
inmate was charged and the type of punishment
Board ................
5 (5%)
he received. For example, an inmate who gets
2
(2%)
Kept in Cell ..............
into trouble with the guards is as likely to be
0 (0%)
Transferred ...............
reprimanded, or given a suspended punishment,
2
(2%)
Charges Dropped ..........
3 (2%)
or put on probation (all relatively light penalties)
Not Guilty ............
2 (2%)
Other .................
as he is to lose good time (a very severe punishment). Moreover, one may lose good time or be
Total No. of Dispositions. 110 (100%) 229 (100%)
segregated for mere refusal, or being out of place,
or talking when not permitted, as well as for the
more serious offenses of escape, fighting, and use
time
the
same
at about
wardens, which took place
111
or possession of alcohol or drugs. Much the same
as the decree took effect.
can be said for prior detention--one is just about
113 By way of contrast, there was much less of a
change in the types of misconduct being brought before as likely to be detained prior to a hearing for
the Board. This may reflect the fact that the decree lesser offenses as for more serious ones. Table 5
did not deal with this topic, or it may be that the shows the correlation between the various types
warden either did not disagree with the existing
practices or else was not able to translate desired of misconducts and dispositions found in the
change into practice. Table 4 describes the types of study's record sample.
misconduct brought before the Board before and after
There are a number of possible explanations for
the decree, as revealed by our record sample.
these findings. One is that our judgment as to the
TABLE 4
seriousness of an offense may be considerably
MIscoNDucr BEFORE AND AFTER THE DECREE
different from that of the Disciplinary Board.
That is, to the members of the Board, being out of
Date of Misconduct
place may be as serious as fighting. While this
Misconduct
7/69-3/10/70 3/11/70-10/70
explanation might rationalize the seeming lack of
After
Before
difference in the range of punishments for the
various types of misconduct, it still would not
Trouble with Guards .......
(35%) 64 (31%)
explain the differences in punishment within each
(15%) 47 (22%)
Fighting/A & B ...........
misconduct category.
32
(15%)
(15%)
Refusals ..................
(1%)
A second possible explanation is that the dis0 (0%)
Escape ...................
(1%) 15 (7%)
positional decision is not based on categorization
Poss. Prohib. Articles ......
14 (7%)
Alcohol, Drugs ............
(3%)
of the type of misconduct, but on the details of
(0%)
9 (4%)
Creating a Disturbance ....
the individual incident. This explanation is un14 (7%)
(0%)
Out of Place ..............
tenable not only because the fact-finding process
4 (2%)
Destruction of State Prop...
(5%)
was too inadequate to suggest Disciplinary Board
0 (0%)
Throwing Food Out of Cell.
(18%)
consideration of the circumstances of individual
1 (1%)
Fire in Cell ...............
(3%)
incidents, but also because one would still expect
0 (0%)
Larceny of Table ..........
(3%)
1 (1%)
the different categories of misconduct to show some
Violating Security Rules....
(1%)
1 (1%)
(0%)
significant differences in disposition. In the larger
Cutting Wrists ............
5 (2%)
(0%)
Carrying Protest Sign ......
criminal justice system, for example, while both a
murderer and a pickpocket may receive suspended
Total No. of Infractions..1 78 (100%) 207 (100%)
sentences due to the circumstances of their indiTABLE 3
PUNISHMINT BEFORE AND AFTER THE DECREE

19721
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TABLE 5
CORRELATION BETWEEN MiscoNDucT AND DISPOSITION
Type of Punishment (Numbers of Inmates)

I
Type of Misconduct

Troubl w/Guards .......
Fighting, A & B ........
Refusals ................
Alcohol, Drugs ..........
Other Prohibited Articles .............
General Disturbance .....
Escape .................
Destruction of Prop......
Out of Place ............
Throwing Food .........
Talking at Wrong Time..
Carrying Protest Sign ....
Fire in Cell .............
Larceny of Table ........
Cutting Wrist ...........

Loss Refered
to
of
Class.
Privs. Board

gated

Rep.
Susp.
Prob.

67
19
20
27

43
13
15
14

41
40
15
4

20
16
14
2

11
0
11
15

6
1
10
2

10
1
1
5

8
3
6
0

68
60
42
20

26
15
11
5

20
17
23
4
4
1
5
0
3
0
1

15
28
30
16
2
0
2
0
1
0
0

7
5
1
4
5
0
4
4
1
2
0

3
3
6
2
9
12
0
0
1
0
1

4
18
25
4
6
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
7
8
6
4
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
6
8
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

28
21
11
18
15
0
6
4
1
0
0

6
2
2
1
4
0
1
0
1
0
0

vidual crime, it is unlikely that the pickpocket
would ever be subject to the same maximum sentence as the murderer. That is, there is a scale of
seriousness reflected in our criminal code, indicated
by the maximum punishment to which an offender
is subject. There seems to be no such scale with
regard to prison offenses at the ACI. Using maximum punishments as an indicator of seriousness,
it would seem that virtually every category of misconduct is potentially as serious as the others.
A third possible explanation of the divergence
of misconduct and disposition is that punishment
varies not according to the facts of the incident
itself, but according to the institutional history of
the offender." 4 This may mean an inmate is
branded as a "troublemaker" for whatever reason
and however appropriately. Such an indelible
mark on an inmate's informally perceived record
may arise from an inmate's getting into fights, or
his reading revolutionary literature, or his pressing
court claims against the institution. At times, these
underlying grounds of decisions are articulated;
more often, they are not.
Regardless of the explanation, apparent dispositional inconsistencies can only lead the inmate
to question the fairness of the disciplinary process
and to attribute the discrepancies to some other
114

Cf. note 91 supra.

Pre- Detention
HearConing
Other Detensidtion
ered

Loss
of
Good
Time

Segre-

Kept
in
Cell

Trans- 9ChargesI Not
pped
Guilt
fer

factor, such as the differences in personality type
of the two Deputy Wardens, or the custodial composition of the Board, or blatant discrimination
against him. Individualized punishment may have
its advantages, but it must be based on an objective appraisal of the inmate's problem and his
conduct, and should rest on dearly articulated
rationales." 5
1- The correctional field has witnessed a debate between those who would advocate individualized punishment and those who favor a fixed penalty for each type
of misconduct. Proponents of the fixed penalty maintain that individualized dispositions by the disciplinary
court are "vague, contradictory and inconsistent" and
"preclude a stable atmosphere of inmate expectations
around the definition and limits of orderly behavior."
R. KopN & L. McCoar=t, CRIMINOLOGY A_D PENOLOGY 476 (1959). They further contend that, absent
uniformity in punishment, correctional officials will lose
confidence in the disciplinary court and apply their own
punishments. Id.
Proponents of individualized punishment posit that
objectionable behavior in prison is so diverse that any
set of rules will be so "complex as to be difficult to
apply, or so arbitrary as to arouse resentment by
dealing similarly with highly diverse acts." D. GLASER,

TnE EFEcr rvENEss

OF A PRISON AND)PAROLE SYSTEM

179 (1964). The proponents maintain that flexible rules
will minimize inmate-staff friction by providing for
penalties which are likely to have a positive effect on
the future behavior of the individual offender. Id.
The appropriate solution may lie somewhere in
between, perhaps, as Glaser suggests, by using a
flexible policy for major infractions and a more rigid
policy for the less serious violations. Id. at 184.
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TABLE 6
TYPE OF DISPOSITION COMPARED WrI

CUSTODIAL CLASSIwICATION
Custodial Setting

Type of Disposition
Work Release

Segregated ..........................
Lost Good Time .....................
Reprimand, Suspended, Probation ....
Lost Privileges ......................
Referred to Classification Board ........
Kept in Cell ........................
Transferred .........................
Charges Dropped ....................
Not Guilty .........................
Other ..............................

18
17
2
1
21
5
7
0
0
1

Total Number of Dispositions .........

72 (100%)

(25%)
(24%)
(3%)
(1%)
(29%)
(7%)
(10%)
(0%)
(0%)
(1%)

TABLE 7
DETENTION CONSIDERED COMPARED WITH CUSTODIAL
SETTING
Custodial Setting
Work
Release

MediumMinimum

Maximum

Pre-Hearing

Detention....
Detention Considered in Final Disposition .........

8 (30%) 132 (68%) 116 (44%)

1 (4%)

35 (18%)

31 (12%)

Total Disciplinary Cases... 27 (100%) 194 (100%) 264 (100%)
ii. Correlation between dispositions and custodial setting. The custodial setting in which an
inmate was incarcerated and therefore the Disciplinary Board to which he was subject did make
a difference in the disciplinary treatment of the
inmate. In general, punishment in the minimum
facility was harsher than that in maximum. Table
6 describes the study's analysis of the record sample
according to custodial classification. In minimum,
an inmate charged with a disciplinary violation was
much more likely to be segregated or lose good
time than an inmate in maximum. Conversely, he
was much less likely to be merely reprimanded,
given a suspended punishment or probation, lose
privileges, have his charges dropped, or be found

Medium-Minimum

111
107
40
11
58
23
36
3
0
4

(28%)
(27%)
(10%)
(3%)
(15%)
(6%)
(9%)
(1%)
(0%)
(1%)

393 (100%)

Maximum

76
33
83
71
21
14
1
15
13
12

(22%)
(10%)
(25%)
(21%)
(6%)
(4%)
(0%)
(4%)
(4%)
(4%)

339 (100%)

not guilty, than his fellow inmate in maximum.
While a large proportion of all inmates are likely
to be detained prior to the Disciplinary Board
hearing, those in minimum have an even greater
prospect of prehearing detention, as seen in Table 7.
This disparity in dispositions between the two
parts of the institution may be explained in a
number of ways. First, the barracks-type setting
of the medium-minimum facility could make it
more imperative that an unruly inmate be removed
by segregation or reclassification, while in maximum an inmate could be isolated merely by confining him to his own cell. Second, the staff in
medium-minimum may expect more from that
facility's inmates (and work releasees, for that
matter), since the less secure custody classification
is supposed to connote increased privileges tempered by greater responsibility. Hence, due to
their expectations of better behavior, the staff in
medium-minimum may punish misdeeds more
severely.' Finally, the disparity may be due to
the different personnel on both boards and the
absence of any uniform dispositional standard or
guidelines. The impression of the study's observers
was that the different personalities of the members
of the two boards made a significant difference in
the dispositions they reached.
iii. Correlation between dispositions and demographic factors. The study's analysis of this issue
us With the seeming arbitrariness of the classification
procedure at the ACI, see note 108 supra,this notion of
varying institutional expectations may be inappropriate.
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is based on the interview sample of sixty inmates.n
Age, race, length of sentence, number of convictions, maximum release date, and parole eligibility
date appeared to make no significant difference
with respect to the type of misconduct engaged in
or the type of punishment received.
The lack of significant difference on all of these
factors may be due to the limited size of our sample, and therefore, we do not conclude from these
results that the disciplinary system as a whole at
the ACI is non-discriminatory as to any or all of
these factors. On the other hand, our data certainly do not provide any evidence of this kind of
discrimination. Therefore, it would appear that
while the disciplinary process may be individualistic, the individualistic determinations are probably
based upon factors other than, or in addition to,
this demographic data, such as the facts of the incident itself, an overall evaluation of the inmate's
progress, the board members' personal opinions of
the inmate, and the custodial setting.
d. The Use of Classification for Disciplinary
Purposes. As has already been indicated, referral
to the Classification Board is one possible disciplinary dispositional alternative. The Morris
decree established four classification statuses:
Category "A"--This is the normal status of the
general prison population. Inmates in this status
are entitled to all privileges.
Category 'B"--"Category of inmates who because of their pattern [of] conduct require close
restrictive movement and closer supervision than
Category 'A' population on a temporary basis.
Work eligibility is suspended in this category."
Other privileges are limited and living location is
to be determined by the administration.
Category "C"-"Category of inmates whose
conduct indicates chronic inability to adjust to
general prison population or who require maximum
protection for themselves or others or whose conduct constitutes a threat to the security of the
institution." Privileges are even further limited
and the inmate is to be placed in a separate living
location.
Category "D"-"Category for inmates who because of their course of conduct while classified
within Category 'C' require closer control than
provided with 'C' category." Privileges are severely
1 The demographic information was not collected
on the inmates whose hearings were actually observed
or on the record sample because of difficulties inherent
in such data collection.

limited and the inmate is to be placed in a separate
living location.
As established by the consent decree, reclassification from the normal "A" status is '"predicated on
conduct of inmate which indicates inability to adjust in general prison population for the protection
of inmates or others and for the security of the
institution." Any downgrading of status is to be
accompanied by procedural protections similar to
those required for disciplinary proceedings and
must be predicated upon a prior finding of misconduct by the Disciplinary Board. The rationale
underlying this disciplinary reclassification procedure is that once the inmate has been identified by
the Disciplinary Board, on the basis of its finding
of misconduct, as a serious enough disciplinary
problem to warrant segregation, the inmate is to
be referred to the Classification Board for a downgrading of his status from Category "A." He is
then placed in either Category 'B," or "C," or
"D," with concomitantly decreasing privileges." 8
In practice, only rarely does the Classification
Board refer to the A, B, C, and D categories, as
they axe detailed in the regulations. Instead, the
Board speaks in terms of the substance of the
punishment (i.e., segregation, lock-up, etc.) and
not in terms of broad categories of punishment
sets. At times, this practical divergence from the
regulations created considerable confusion." 9
18
This notion of "reclassification" for discipline is
similar to the practice in other correctional systems of
having different types of facilities for inmates who are
disciplinary problems. California, for example, has
special "adjustment centers." In Rhode Island, with
limited resources and limited facilities, this flexibility
does not exist.
n'The following monitored case illustrates this
confusion:
An inmate was charged before the Disciplinary
Board with refusing to give up his cigarettes while
being placed in punitive segregation. The inmate
claimed that, pursuant to the classification categories outlined in the court order, cigarettes were
not one of the privileges that could be denied him.
The hearing chairman said that punitive segregation was something different from the classification
categories established in the order. The inmate

said: '"unitive-what do you think these 'classification' categories are? That's what it's all about."
There was an argument about the meaning of
classification and the difference between classification and discipline. The inmate read from the rules
and argued that he was entitled to cigarettes in
segregation. The chairman admitted that the difference between punitive segregation and some of the
classification categories was confusing. The hearing
then proceeded to other matters. Eventually the
inmate was punished for having sworn at the guard
who told him he couldn't have the cigarettes.
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Moreover, the rigid categories sometimes work to
the disadvantage of the inmates. For example,
Category "B" requires suspension of work eligibility, which, in the view of some staff members, is
not always necessary or prudent for inmates who
might be assigned to that status.
The study's analysis of the record sample revealed that only a relatively small percentage of
the classification hearings120 which were held after
the decree was entered were for disciplinary purposes. Sixteen disciplinary cases out of 229 (7%)
were referred to the Classification Board. Eight
classification hearings out of the 105 (7.67%) monitored by the study's observers involved disciplinary action.' 2' In all these eight cases there was
substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the order.
There seems to be little reason for the Classification Board to be involved in disciplinary considerations at all. Since in practice there is no real
discussion of the appropriate "classification category" for the inmate, but rather a mere imposition
of punishment through downgrading of status, the
Classification Board, in reclassifying inmates,
seems to be performing the same disciplinary
function as the Disciplinary Board. In fact, some
Classification Board members expressed the view
that there were times when the Disciplinary Board,
by referring a case, was merely "passing the buck"
120Classification hearings are held every Tuesday
morning and are chaired on alternate weeks by the
Warden and the Assistant Warden. In attendance at a
typical classification hearing are either the Warden or
Assistant Warden, the deputy wardens of both maximum and medium-minimum, one classification counselor, and the vocational supervisor or his assistant. The
classification counselor reads a summary of the inmate's central file and the Board members discuss
why the inmate is coming before them as well as how
best to dispose of his case. Usually, a determination is
made before the inmate enters the meeting. Once called
in, the inmate is generally asked a few routine questions
(e.g., "Where do you want to work?" "Why don't you
like your present job?"). The inmate is then asked to
leave the room. The Board usually has a brief discussion
of their final disposition; this discussion usually does not
differ very much from their discussion prior to the
inmate's entry into the meeting. The inmate is then
called in for a second time and told where he will be
working or that he has been given a lower or higher
security classification.
"I Although the decree proscribes the Classification
Board's considering misconduct, in a minor sense
misconduct was considered by the Classification Board
in cases other than reclassification. However, these were
not cases involving downgrading. For instance, a
prisoner might have his job changed or his security
rating changed because he was constantly picking fights
in his job or living area. This uses his misconduct, but
not in a severe way such as placing him in segregation.
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and not giving the case the consideration which it
deserves. At the same time, the Classification
Board was distracted from its main function of
designing constructive programs for inmates,"' a
task to which the Board could devote considerably
more time and attention." 3 Discipline at the ACI
should be the responsibility of the Disciplinary
Board exclusively. Disciplinary action should not
interfere with the inmate's institutional program,
unless the misconduct is closely related to that
program (e.g., constant fights with the program
supervisor, escape from work release). If the punishment decided upon requires a disruption of the
inmate's program, the staff and inmate should
work toward restoring the inmate to his program
and toward meeting its rehabilitative goals. In
practical terms, this also means that discipline
will not be according to the rigid A, B, C, or D
categories prescribed in the order; rather, punishment will be more individualized.
Removing the disciplinary function from the
Classification Board does not mean, however, that
the Classification Board cannot consider whether
an inmate's misconduct oi pattern of misconduct
in conjunction with other available information
12 Judge Pettine's decree set the following goals for
the ACI classification process:
The primary objective of classification as a systematic
process is the development and administration of an
integrated and realistic program of treatment for the
individual, with procedures for changing the program
when indicated. This primary objective is attained
through five general approaches: (a) The analysis of
the individual's problems through the use of every
available diagnostic technique, including social investigation, medical, psychological, psychiatric examinations, educational, vocational, religious, and
recreational studies. The observations of custodial
officers offer data of value. (b) A treatment and training
program is evolved in staff conference during or after
the inmate's personal appearance before the Board,
based upon these analyses and a frank discussion of its
purposes with the inmate. (c) The program decided
upon must be placed into operation. (d) It may be
revised when indicated. Classification, a dynamic
process, cannot be effective unless program modifications are made in accordance with the changing needs
of the individual inmate. (e) What is done for the inmate in the institution needs to be correlated with his
program on parole.
" There is no real "systematic process" of developing "an integral and realistic program of treatment for
the individual" at the ACI. Cf. Morris v. Travisono,
310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970). Although this classification inadequacy is primarily a result of a lack of
resources, facilities, staff and training, it may also be
partly attributed to the confusion in the classification
procedure itself. The Classification Board in practice
served three entirely different functions: (1) security
classification (2) job and program classification, and (3)
disciplinary reclassification.
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practicing attorneys.in8 These aides could perform
the following functions:
(1) They could investigate inmate complaints
and where such complaints are dearly unfounded
or lacking sufficient grounds to present a reviewable issue, the aides could explain to the inmates
why they are unlikely to be successful in their
appeal. This function may decrease the number of
F. Review
appeals to the formal reviewing authority.
According to the regulations, review by the
(2) They could assist the inmates in presenting
Warden is required "of any [disciplinary] proceedtheir claims where they are well founded, thereby
ing which ... results in an unfavorable decision for clarifying the issues for review.
the inmate." While the review process .was ex(3) Through their work with inmate complaints,
tremely difficult to monitor, our findings suggest they could help identify deficiencies in procedures,
that although the Warden apparently does "see"
policies and practices and could work with the
all of the decisions of the Disciplinary Board, the prison administration to correct these deficiencies.
excessive time pressure on him makes the present
Although, dearly, where such investigational
review mechanism at the ACI fundamentally in- aides convey their findings directly to the prison
24
adequate
authorities, problems in sustaining inmate trust
In other than extraordinary cases there was and confidence would arise, the mere presence of
very little channelling of information about the such personnel might well induce closer adherence
review process from the Warden down to the staff to all disciplinary regulations by correctional
and inmates. Many inmates were not aware of officers and other prison officials. Furthermore,
their appeal perogatives. Furthermore, although outsiders, either citizen advisory commissions,12 9
in a few select cases the classification counselor special masters,"' or all-purpose ombudsmen,"'
assisted the inmate in the preparation of his ap- may even serve as the final reviewing authority.
peal, a large majority of inmates interviewed The presence of such outsiders might offset some
stated that they did not receive such assistance in of the problems of "internalization" endemic to
preparing their case for the Warden's review. Given
correctional institutions in the following respects:
the fundamental importance of the review process
(1) The outsider's decision is not as likely to be
in insuring the integrity of the disciplinary pro- affected by past, personal, informal knowledge of
ceedings, reforms are critically needed.
the involved parties.
In order for the review process to be effective,
(2) He is less subject to institutional pressures.
the record which serves as a basis for review must He is not threatened, as is the administrative staff,
be complete and must clearly state all the relevant
in Judge Pettine elicited the volunteer services of
issues. 125 While training of staff to perform this
in Rhode Island to assist in investigatfunction in the first instance is important, 2 6 in- several lawyers
ing inmate complaints and preparing legitimate comvestigational aides could be used to help prepare plaints for appropriate review.
129Such groups, composed of private citizens, alcases for review. These aides could include inready exist in some states, including Rhode Island and
ternal prison personnel or outside groups with New York. Usually, however, these groups have been
access to the prison, such as law students"27 or rather inactive, responding only to crisis situations.
110 Such special masters have been appointed to
"2' At the time of the study, the Wardenhad decreased
prevent discrimination in voting, pay, and promotion,
punishment in "three or four cases" within the few and in a recent suit in Philadelphia, federal Judge John
Fullam was asked to appoint a special master to oversee
months he presided over the ACI.
125 Where the record of the proceedings below is
the activities of the police department. The purpose of
incomplete, any review to be based upon a "sub- that master was to control police abuse by conducting
investigations and holding "public contempt" hearings.
stantial evidence requirement" is ineffectual.
121In particular, the initial account by the charging
"' See discussion of the functions of impartial,
officer, the superior officer's investigation and the professional prison ombudsmen, in Gellhorn, Ombudswritten account of the Board hearing should be com- man's Relevance to American Municipal Affairs, 54
pleted in substantially more detail than they are A.B.A.J. 134 (1968). Indeed, the Oregon Department
of Corrections announced that an ombudsman, selected
presently.
from a list of candidates submitted by the inmates,
2 Law students participating in prison legal assistance projects (forming in law schools throughout the would be appointed to expedite the processing of
country) could effectively screen and assist in the inmate grievances.See N.Y. Times, March 6,1971, at 10,
col. 5.
preparation of cases for review.
about him requires a revision of his program.
That decision, however, should not be a punitive
or disciplinary one, but should result in an individualized reorientation of goals and means to
reach these goals consonant with the inmate's
progress up to that ime.
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by disrupting staff morale. His examination of the
facts would not be encumbered by an automatic
presumption against the inmate's credibility.
(3) Whether or not the initial stages of the disciplinary proceeding have been fair, an objective
outsider is likely to have more credibility with
inmates because of the apparent impartiality of
his position.
(4) His fact-finding investigation may meet
with greater success because inmates with relevant
information may be less fearful of retaliatory action than they would be when revealing possibly
self-incriminatory evidence to administrative staff.
Although such outsiders may initially be viewed
as a threat to the administrative staff of the correctional institution, their continued presence, in
helping to secure the integrity of the disciplinary
process, might eventually lend authority and
greater inmate respect for correctional personnel.
An efficient and effective review procedure is
essential, both to correct any injustices that might
occur in the disciplinary proceeding and to assure
the proper functioning of the system consistent
with the disciplinary regulations. Review, then,
should not only be seen as a process of correcting
abuses, but should also be viewed by the prison
administration as a means of monitoring the internal operations of the prison.
IV. THE Lnmrs oF THE PROCEDURAL
DUE PRocEss APPROACH

As the preceding discussion has indicated, disciplinary and classification procedures at the ACI,
observed by the Center's researchers after the
imposition of the Morris decree, did not meet the
expectations of the court. While notice was often
given, its adequacy was questionable; indeed, a
substantial number of the inmates interviewed
claimed that they never received any notice. Prehearing detention was as prevalent after the decree
as before, and the reasons for such detentions were
nowhere recorded. The superior officer's investigation was little more than a restatement of the
charge and a cursory report of the inmate's attitude. Classification counselors were tom between
conflicting role requirements and consequently
were unable to afford the inmates the vigorous
advocacy which was anticipated by the representation provision of the regulations. The Disciplinary
Board hearings were substantially dispositional in
nature, with little effort' at fact-finding and a great
deal of deference given to the testimony of the
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charging officer and to the views of the Board
chairman. While the extremes of the Board's dispositions were ostensibly eliminated, there were
one or two cases in which the maximum punishment limits appeared to have been exceeded. In
addition, the classification categories set out in the
decree proved unduly restrictive in practice. And
finally, the review process was inadequate.
Although this summary statement of our findings presents a rather pessimistic picture of the
practical application of the Morris decree to the
ACI, inmate responses to the effects of the new
classification and disciplinary procedures were, for
the most part, far from unfavorable. While much
of this positive inmate response may be merely a
reaction to judicial intervention and attention,In
rather than an indication of the practical impact
of the decree, there clearly were some objective
manifestations of institutional change. Cases were
dismissed where there were technical violations of
the regulations, inmate witnesses were allowed in
some cases, delays between charge and final hearing were minimized, and the extreme forms of
punishment which instigated the imposition of the
order were largely eliminated.iD Further, there.was
a growing recognition by administrative and
custodial staff that inmates did have rights, rights
that would be contested and enforced. Acceptance
of this fundamental notion is a necessary predicate
to any effective prison reform. However, despite
any progressive changes promulgated by the new
regulations, the effectiveness of the procedural due
3
process model at the ACI was critically limited.
1n The inmates were generally quite -aware of the
decree's existence. A copy of the regulations was to be
distributed to every inmate at the ACI and given to
every newly committed prisoner upon entry. To check
the familiarity of the prison population with the
decree, we asked the inmates in our interview sample
whether they had heard of the decree, received a copy
of it, read a copy of it, discussed it and used it. Their
responses were: Heard of decree (88%0); Received copy
(70%); Read copy (68%); Discussed copy (57%);
Used decree (2300).
13 Again it is important to reiterate the difficulty of
determining how many of these changes resulted from
the court decree and how many can be attributed to the
new Warden.
14In examining and evaluating the effect of the
Morris decree, our analysis has been directed toward
what we have described as a procedural due process
model, a model which stipulates procedures providing
for a limited adversary hearing. This procedural
protection approach followed by the Morris court is the
one most often taken by courts when problems of
checking administrative discretion have been presented
to them.
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The following discussion will suggest reasons for
this limited effectiveness.
A. The Multiple Purposes of Prisons
The court's decree approaches prison disciplinary procedures irk a basically unidimensional
manner, imposing intricatelact-finding procedures
as preconditions to disciplinary actions. Although
the similarity of this procedural due process
approach to the judicial trend toward insuring
procedural regularity in our criminal system is
apparent, the dissimilarities between the prison
disciplinary setting and the criminal trial setting
are equally apparent. Prison disciplinary processes
often serve multiple if not conflicting purposes.
Any analysis of such correctional processes must
therefore be viewed in the context of these multiple
objectives.
Perhaps the most significant factor observed by
our researheri was that the disciplinary processes at the ACI were pervasively dispositional in
nature1
The critical problem, therefore, in
applying a procedural due process model to the
ACI is that such a model is designed to insure the
integrity and fairness of the fact-finding, and not.
the dispositional, process. Certainly, where there is
a dispute as to the facts of a particular case, fair
procedures in resolving that dispute are desirable.
However, the value of these procedures may be
considered against their possible interference with
other functions and the purposes of the disciplinary process.
We have already examined some of the reasons
6
why fact-finding is minimized at the ACI1
Primary among them is the preservation of staff
morale, especially custodial staff morale. The
presumption of credibility must be against the
inmate if the members of the Disciplinary Board
are to continue to be on "good terms" with the
charging and superior officers with whom they
work daily. This maintenance of staff morale is
reflected not only in the minimization of the factfinding process, but also in the types of conduct
subject to disciplinary action. Well over one-third
of the misconduct incidents for which inmates were
brought before the Disciplinary Board involved
conflicts with guards and staff.11r
1 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
16 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
1v Incidents involving trouble with guards or staff
and refusals to obey prison personnel comprise 39%
of the disciplinary incidents in our sample. See Table 1.

- Scrutiny of the types of behavior subject to
disciplinary action reveals that the maintenance of
control is another critical purpose of the disciplinary process at the AC."' Discipline contributes
to control, not only by curtailing potentially
disruptive incidents, but also by creating a substantial deterrent to such disruption. Clearly, the
maintenance of tight control is a paramount
concern of all prison administrators. However, at
the ACI, almost all "rule infractions" were
viewed as threats to control and institutional
authority. Such rigidity of response and attitude
may well exacerbate rather than ease the control
problem.
Treatment is yet another potential purpose of a
prison disciplinary systemY"' While the wide range
of punishable actions and the types of dispositions
meted out at the ACI might not immediately
suggest concern for treatment as a prime factor in
the disciplinary process, 40 a staff member commented:
The court decree works against the inmate. It is
too formal, too rigid. It dehumanizes the ACL We
have tried to humanize the ACI by abolishing the
use of prison numbers. The new regulations work
in the opposite direction1U
The prison disciplinary system may also serve as
a means of suppressing unpopular views. The
banning of certain books,"' limitations on.protest
Many of these incidents led to rather severe penalties.
See Table 2.
m The vast majority of misconduct violations reported were for actions threatening institutional
control or authority. See Table 1. These were not
situations in which large-scale riots or outbreaks were
likely, but ones in which the reporting staff member
felt that his authority or that of the institution had been
threatened. The inmate may have refused to do a
certain job, talked back, or in some other way affronted
authority. While a single incident would not usually
have any major repercussions, institutional administrators generally feel that repeated incidents of this
type could eventually mushroom into an outbreak of
major proportions.
9But see Sol Rubin's critique that treatment for
inmates may really be an illusion. Rubin, Illusions of
Treatment in Sentences and Civil Commitments, 16
Cmm & Dx-.rn. 79 (1970).
140The line differentiating punishment from treatment is not always clear. Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). Of course, punitive action may be a form of
treatment, just as some types of treatment may be
punitive.
' This comment to our researchers was made at one
of the weekly meetings the Warden had with his supervisory staff in response to a question asking whether a
more detailed, explicit disciplinary code was needed.
"2Cf. 83 HAnv. L. REv. N 2, at VII (With The
Editors) (1969) describing the Sostre case. See note 37
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activitiesW and the censorship of mail 1 -all
raise serious first amendment questions. Although
such suppression may not be a legitimate objective
of prison discipline, 45 in framing procedures appropriate to such a system, all of the relevant
purposes and processes must first be ascertained.
Punishment, maintenance of staff morale, control,
deterrence, treatment, and the suppression of unpopular ideas must all be considered before a
system can be designed which will accommodate
the often conflicting purposes of prison discipline.
B. Different Levels of Disciplinary Action Within

the Prison
Another factor limiting the effectiveness of the
court's decree was the fact that the regulations
applied substantially the same procedural system
to all disciplinary incidents, no matter how minor
or serious.46 Traditionally, our criminal justice
system has drawn distinctions in handling offenses
according to their severity. Crimes are classified
into misdemeanors and felonies,' 4 with lesser
penalties for the less serious offenses, and often
with separate institutional facilities for housing
the two classes of offenders. Moreover, we tend to
provide greater procedural protections for the
alleged serious offender than we do for the misdemeanant, presumably because of the possibility of
more severe punishment.'"
As we have already discussed, the types of acts
subject to discipline in a particular institution are a
function of the purposes of the disciplinary system.
Ifan institution eased its rigid approach to "consupra. The Review reports that Sostre's offenses included "distributing copies of the Harvard Law Review
to other prisoners."
141
One of the cases presented before the Disciplinary
Board in the maximum security institution involved
an inmate who had refused to remove from his cell a
protest sign which he had carried into the dining hall.
14aSee note 23 supra.
145See id.
14

6Itis important to note that the decree did provide
that "an officer or employee observing minor violations
should handle such incidents tactfully and firmly by
warning and counselling." Furthermore, an amendment
to the decree isued by Judge Pettine, provided for a
more informal "two-night lock-up" procedure for
minor disciplinary infractions. See note 150 infra. It is
clear, however, that such informal procedures can be
the subject of severe abuse without proper staff
training and attitudinal changes.
147
Indeed, the Model Penal Code establishes four
categories of offenses differentiated according to the
punishment permitted. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(1)
(1962).
14 Cf. the "petty offense" doctrine for jury trials.
See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 33 (1964);
Low v. United States, 169 F'. 86 (6th Cir. 1909).
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trol," some acts presently handled through the
formal disciplinary process, particularly many of
those resulting from inmate-guard altercations,
could be handled in different manners. Staff
personnel could be trained to handle these situations non-punitively. As with the policeman in
potential riot situations, the prison staff should be
trained to play down minor situations and not to
escalate them through their own words or actions.'
This does not mean that the staff member should
usurp the Disciplinary Board's function; rather it
may require the staff member occasionally to
tolerate or ignore an inmate's abusive remark. If
such minor incidents do reach the Disciplinary
Board, the Board should not always feel bound to
reach a "disciplinary decision" and impose some
form of punishment. Taking "no action" in such
cases may be in itself very significant action.
Furthermore, some matters, while serious enough
to warrant discipline, do not require full Disciplinary Board hearings with all the attendant procedural protectionsj5W In these cases, dispositional
decisions might best be made on the level of the
superior officer or Deputy Warden after a thorough
investigation of all the facts and a written record of
detailed -findings has been made. The inmate
should have the opportunity to have this decision
reviewed by the Disciplinary Board~in
"' To say that this attitudinal change would require
extensive training is an understatement. Custodial
personnel traditionally have viewed any act of disobedience, however minor, as a serious threat to
institutional order. An understandable attitude is
"if we let this inmate get away with his actions, thirty
others will follow suit." This custodial response, not
without foundation, focuses on the central problem of
differentiating between actions which require punishments basically for deterrence purposes and ones which
do not.
0
1w
An example of such nondisciplinary board
discipline is the "two-night lock-up" procedure at the
ACI. Under this procedure, a charging officer, with the
supervision of a superior officer, could have an inmate
confined to his cell for two consecutive nights in
response to a minor disciplinary infraction. There was
considerable difference of opinion as to whether
provisions of the regulations could be construed to
allow such discretionary disciplinary action. In response
to this confusion, as well as to inmate complaints about
the abuse of the two-night lock-up procedure (through
"piggybacking" consecutive two-night lock-ups),
Judge Pettine amended his decree to formalize the
two-night lock-up procedure. The amendment gives
the inmate "the option of a written charge and subsequent appearance before the Disciplinary Board, or
administrative loss of institutional privileges for a
period of up to two nights." The amendment also limits
the number of such options available to the inmate to
three incidents per month, after which time the inmate
must appear before the Disciplinary Board,
1
w Such an option for Disciplinary Board review is
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A fundamental problem with such a two-tiered
approach to disciplinary action would be differentiating between cases which require formal
hearing before the Disciplinary Board and those
which would not. Perhaps the most appropriate
standard for allocating the responsibility for the
decision would be according to the potential
1 2
severity of the punishment- This does not mean
that a detailed list of penalites must be prescribed
for each type of misconduc; 153 rather, the nonDisciplinary Board dispositional authority would
be limited to minor punishments, such as a denial of
privileges for a short period of time. In cases
involving potentially severe dispositions, such as
extended segregation and/or the loss of good time,
the inmate would be afforded the more extensive
procedural safeguards provided by Board hearings.
C. The Closed Nature of the PrisonSetting.
Traditionally prisons are isolated and of low
visibility to the outside world. This pervasive
"closed" atmosphere has diverse effects upon the
prison disciplinary system. The closed nature of
the institution makes it inevitable that Disciplinary
Board members bring personal knowledge of each
inmate to the hearings. Although, in many instances this personal information may have some
dispositional value, often it taints the proceedings
with unfair prejudice.
Furthermore, an inmate who chooses to defend
himself vigorously by directly challenging a
guard's veracity may, because of the nature of the
institution, find himself subject to harmful and
perhaps unanticipated repercussions. 5 4 Unlike
the court defendant, who may never again come
into contact with the arresting officer, in most
instances the inmate must return to his same cell or
shop area, under the supervision of the officer whose
charge brought him before the Disciplinary Board,
and whose credibility he has challenged. With
proper training and restraint, an officer of the
institution may learn to disregard this challenge.
similar to that option effected by the amended decree's
two-night lock-up procedure. The inmate should be
made aware of the fact that the Disciplinary Board is
not limited in its possible disposition of the case, as is
the superior officer who handles the action informally.
162For cases employing other two-tiered approaches
to prison disciplinary procedures, see note 42 supra.
15 See note 115 supra, for a discussion of fixed versus
individualized punishment.
I" Clearly, to the extent that the inmate anticipates
such unfortunate repercussions, he may be deterred
from actively defending himself and challenging the
charging officer's version of the facts.

It is at least equally possible, however, that an
offended officer may harass and- intimidate the
inmate, especially in those rare cases where the
inmate has, in effect, won at the Disciplinary
Board hearing.
Moreover, the closed nature of the institution
also allows prison personnel to discipline inmates
summarily as a means of avoiding formal procedural requirements with their attendant additional
paper work. While it is very difficult for an outside
evaluator to discover the extent of unauthorized
discipline, we were able to get some insights on that
subject from the inmates in our interview sample.
Twenty-three inmates (38%) reported being
subject to disciplinary action by procedures other
than coming before the Board.155
There is little question that some discipline was
administered contrary to the provisions of the
court decree, but it is difficult to determine whether
such activity increased or decreased after the new
regulations. One could speculate that if members
of the piison staff resented the court's intervention
and saw the decree as unduly restricting their
actions, they might respond by bypassing the
formal disciplinary procedures in favor of summary
discipline. The diversity of inmate comments on
the issue of non-Disciplinary Board punishment
leaves this question open for speculation.
D. Staff Training and Involvement
Another significant factor limiting the effectiveness of the decree was the lack of any staff involvement in its formulation and the lack of staff training
with regard to its implementation. Even though
the decree was based upon a consent agreement
between the parties, that agreement did not really
reflect the views of the employees of the ACI or
even of its supervisory staff. The agreement was
framed primarily by counsel for the Department of
Social Welfare (who had relatively little experience
within the prison itself) and by the Acting Warden.
155 Segregation was usually imposed only for the more
serious types of misconduct--strike, escape, riot,
suspicion of committing a crime, bribery-although it
was occasionally used for fighting, being out of place,
trouble with the staff, and possession of prohibited
articles. The two-night lock-up, however, was typically
the preferred punishment for these latter types of
misconduct. Further, it is interesting to note that
inmates did not mention other types of informal
punishment, such as harassment and loss of privileges.
It is doubtful that there has not been at least some of
this form of discipline. However, it is possible that the
inmates interviewed might not have really thought of
such action as a punishment in the context of our
questions about discipline.
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The new Warden and the rest of the staff simply
inherited their work, almost by default.
The cooperation of the staff, particularly the
custodial staff, is essential for the effective implementation and operation of any disciplinary
system. The guards initially detect all disciplinary
problems and are likely to have the most knowledge
about the alleged infractions, as well as about the
inmates involved. Because of their responsibility
for initiating the disciplinary process, the custodial staff is in a unique position to bypass or
abuse that process. For example, a guard may
simply ignore observed violations; he may arbitrarily or discriminatorily report some inmates and
not others; he may exaggerate infractions in his
"booking"; or he may substitute unwarranted
informal discipline and harassment for the established processes. Furthermore, where the disciplinary scheme includes procedural requirements, a
staff member may negate, or at least undermine,
the whole process by failing to comply with one or
more of the required procedures. Moreover, correctional officer cooperation is essential because of
the crucial effect that the conduct of custodial
personnel has on the inmates' view of the prison
1 56
system.
The ACI staff resented the fact that they had not
been involved in the framing of the Morris decree.
Some custodial personnel expressed such strong
resentment to the court's intervention and their
non-involvement in that process that they refused
to read the copy of the regulations which had been
distributed to them. One staff member commented:
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composed in a vacuum and will be extremely
impractical in its application to the ACT."
Another source of resentment, which may have
in turn affected. the degree of staff compliance with
the regulations, was the custodial staff's reluctant
recognition of inmate rights and the burdensome
problem of enforcing these rights. Officials and
guards alike began to view the court not as an
impartial arbiter, but as an advocate for the
inmates. Administrators resented the repeated
trips to court to defend themselves against inmate
charges, not only because they felt that their
rightful discretion was being fettered, but also
because of the amount of time they were required
to spend away from the prison. Some of the guards
felt that the decree had resulted in a tremendous
loss of discipline and control by easing the disciplinary penalties and hence decreasing the factor of
deterrence. A typical comment was, "Officers are
reluctant to book because they think the guy will
only get a reprimand." The fact that the penalties
were less onerous, they felt, tended to undermine
their authority as did the repeated threats by
inmates to take every complaint directly to the
judge. Furthermore, because of the increased
amount of paper work necessary for entering a
booking or an infraction, officers were said to be
less inclined to make such bookings.
Somewhat paradoxically, the guards also felt the
regulations should be more detailed and definitive.
Custodial staff felt trapped by some of the vagueness in the decree, especially about when a prehearing lock-up was permitted.Z57 Moreover, some of the
supervisory administrative staff felt that the
There is some confusion as to who is running the
guards were afraid of the decree because of the
ACI, the Warden or Judge Pettine. Judge Pettine's
possibility of contempt proceedings and the possiintervention is important to bring attention to the
bility of being censured in open court.5 3 In an
inadequacies in corrections, but he must act in
effort to counteract this adverse custodial reaction,
conjunction with the Warden. Many aspects of
Judge Pettine went to the prison and met with the
the new regulations apply more to a larger instituguards. He emphasized that he expected that there
tion than to the ACL
would be a good faith attempt to comply with the
The staff urged that if there is a new or final decree decree, and that he was not concerned with techthe court should work directly with the ACI nicalities. However, he was met with some hostility
administrative and custodial staff in framing its and a great deal of dissatisfaction. 59
157
provisions. "Without such cooperation;" another
See note 67 supra for discussion of the confusion
staff member commented, "the decree will be created by the decree's provision for locking up inmates.
156Cf. What Do Administratire and Professional
168This fear was heightened by Judge Motley's
Staffs Think About Their Correctional System, CoR- decision in Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
RECTIONAL EsEARCH, Bulletin No. 17, Part Two (May,
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), which awarded compensatory and
1968), at 2. Respondents to the study were "in general punitive damages against prison officials for violation
agreement that correctional officers do, indeed, exceed
of an inmate's civil rights. On appeal, punitive damages
all other categories of staff members in the extent of were disallowed. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d
their influence on prisoners; 311 (85%) of the 366 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, -U.S.-- (1972).
159
For example, one guard stated at the meeting,
respondents expressed that opinion."
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This custodial antagonism clearly indicates that
in addition to involving staff in formulation of
disciplinary policy and procedures, 6 ' once the
system is developed, extensive staff training is
essential for any effective implementation. Several
members of the supervisory staff felt that the
custodial officers were confused by the new regulations. As one supervisory official commented:
The old guard must be re-educated toward more
rehabilitative approaches. Any officer who has
been with tle ACI for ten years or more has a
tendency to -think more in terms of discipline.
Thirty out of eighty officers in maximum have
been within the ACI for ten years or more-fiftyfive out of eighty for more than five years. There
must be an extensive training program developed
for all officers.
In the final analysis, the success or failure of any
new correctional program depends upon the underlying attitudes of the custodial as well as the
administrative staff toward the change. Where
there is antagonism, no amount of care in drafting
meticulous provisions and structuring intricate
processes will achieve the objective of a fair and
impartially administered disciplinary system.
E. InadequateFacilities and Resources
Perhaps the most pervasive limitation which
plagues the ACI is the inadequacy of its resources.
Due to the structural limitations of the ACI's
maximum and medium-minimum security institutions, inmates of vastly different criminal
backgrounds and degrees of institutional "adjustment" are all lumped together. These inadequate living conditions, compounded by the almost
complete absence of training programs, exacerbate
disciplinary problems. Where resources allocated
by the state legislature remain entirely inadequate,
any judicial decree, however thoughtfully designed,
which go to
cannot remedy these fundamental ills
the very core of the prison disciplinary system.
V. A CONCLUDING Loox AT THE CounT's ROLE
We began this study by stating that we would
examine not only the decree's effect on the disciplinary process at the ACI,but also the effectiveness
of the court as an institutional mechanism for
"We find it impossible to run this place under these
foolish
1 0 rules which we had nothing to do with making."
Inmate views should also be solicited. Inmate
complaints and comments were actively encouraged by
Judge Pettine through sealed, written communications
as well as through court appearances.

assuring fairness in administrative decision-making,
particularly in the prison context. Courts wouldnot seem particularly well-suited for such a task
for a number of reasons.
First, American courts' 6 ' are designed primarily
for resolving factual controversies. Each party in
the adversary system presents those facts which
best support his contentions. The judiciary is not
suitedforremedyingmanagerial and administrative
problems, such as the design of prison disciplinary
processes, which involve multiple and complex
purposes and require extensive consultation with
the affected staffs and inmate populations. as well
as subsequent training and supervision of personnel.
Usually, the court has before it only what relevant
evidence the parties present, and party presentations will probably be inadequate for a task as
"many-centered"''2 as the development of a
prison disciplinary system.
Second, being limited to the evidence presented
by the parties before it, most courts will lack the
expertise necessary to understand the unique
problems of discipline within the prison context.
While such expertise may not be necessary for the
resolution of a particular case of abuse, it is desirable for the broader fashioning of policies and
regulations for the institution.
Third, any such decree requires a massive
burden of supervision. The load of litigation on
Judge Pettine was so great that he virtually had to
set up a special calender for prison cases, even
though the ACI is a relatively small institution.
However, these reasons are not as controlling as
they might first appear. Courts have increasingly
extended class actions, declaratory judgments, and
161 Both Italy and France have judges with specific
responsibility for prison matters. In Italy, he is called
the surveillance judge and he has "the responsibility of
regularly visiting the penitentiaries within his jurisdiction and seeing that they are being administered
according to law." Mueller, Punishment, Corrections
and the Law, 45 NEB. L. R.v. 58, 96 (1966). Here, the
appointment of such a judge would probably require
legislation, although a judge for prisons might arise by
judicial fiat if the presiding judge of the jurisdiction
simply calendared all prison cases to a particular judge.
162 Professor Lon Fuller developed in detail the idea
that "many-centered" or "polycentric" problems are
not suitable for judicial resolution. Fuller, Collective
Bargainingand the Arbitrator,1963 Wis. L. Rxv. 3. He
states:
If an optimum solution [to these problems of
managerial direction] had to be reached through
adjudicative procedures, the court would have had
to set forth an almost endless series of possible
divisions and direct the parties to deal with each in
turn.
Id. at 33.
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the use of the expertise of special masters.1" In
addition, many courts have not been reluctant to
solicit the advice of experts, if necessary. judge
Pettine consulted and received comments from a
number of penologists with national experience.
Furthermore, the court may obtain aid in its
supervisory task through review mechanisms such
as those previously discussed."' However, the
critical reason why courts must continue to intervene in inmates' rights cases is because no viable
alternative exists. Legislatures have been consistently unresponsive to prison needs. 165 Citizens'
commissions seem to respond only to crisis situ6 In addition, under the Federal Magistrates Act,
there seems to be some latitude for utilizing a magistrate
in this connection. The relevant provision, found in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970), reads as follows:
(b) Any district court of the United States, by
the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of
such district court, may establish rules pursuant to
which any full-time United States magistrate, or,
where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably
available, any part-time magistrate specially designed by the court, may be assigned within the
territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not
restricted to...
(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses, and sunnission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge
as to whether there
having urisdiction over the caseadded].
shold bea hearing. [emphasis

4See note 129 supra.
165It is to be remembered that inmates do not
constitute a voting constituency.
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ations, fading into the background when the
flare-up is over. The courts often provide the only
continuing outlet for the hearing of grievances and
the solution of conflicts concerning correctional
administration. 66 And while judicial solutions may
never be fully implemented, at least they may
succeed in eliminating extreme abuses, or perhaps
more optimistically, in setting a model and a tone
for eventual internal reform by the prisons themselves.
Our study has documented and evaluated
judicial intervention in one particular correctional
institution. Although much of our analysis would
apply to other institutions, further empirical
research is necessary, analyzing conditions and the
remedial effects of judicial intervention in other
prisons. However, the death of forty-two inmates
and guards at the correctional institution in
Attica, New York, is a tragic reminder that research is simply not enough. If Attica is to be
history rather than precedent, active intervention
by concerned and knowledgeable correctional
officials and legislators as well as courts is essential
to effect long overdue institutional reform.
66As Fuller has stated: "I am not here asserting
that an agency called a 'court' should never under any
circumstances undertake to solve a 'polycentric'
problem. Confronted by a dire emergency, or by a
clear constitutional direction, a court may feel itself
compelled to do the best it can with this sort of problem." Fuller, supra note 162, at 34.

